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Sight is an extremely important sense for humans. Relative to most other mammals, 
we rely on vision much more than on our other senses, such as smell and touch, 
and accordingly a large part of our brain is devoted to visual processing. In vision, 
the light that enters the eyes is converted into electrical signals by the retina, 
and then sent to the visual regions of the brain. Here, these electrical signals 
are processed by a hierarchy of brain regions that extract increasingly complex 
information, ultimately resulting in awareness of the visual scene. For decades, 
this sequence of events was thought to entirely capture the processes giving rise 
to vision: perception was seen as a passive process, in which the contents of 
perception were completely determined by a one-way stream that began with 
the incoming sensory signal. So long as the incoming sensory information was of 
sufficient strength, it would result in perception, and the contents of perception 
directly reflected the input to the eyes. However, visual illusions reveal that what 
we perceive is not always a veridical reflection of the world. To experience this, 
look at the centre blocks on the front and top faces of the cube in Figure 1.1A. 
Figure 1.1. Perception is more than meets the eye.
A) Patches with an identical hue are perceived differently depending on inferred lighting 
conditions. B) Connecting the patches breaks the illusion. C) Simple depth cues cause 
identical objects to appear to differ in size. A prior that distance reduces an object’s size 
causes the rightmost soldier to appear larger than his counterparts. D) A prior that light 
shines from above determines whether the circles are seen as protruding (convex) or 
receding (concave).
A
C
B
D
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The square in the centre of the front face looks to be an orange colour, whereas 
the square in the centre of the top face looks to be a brown colour. In fact, these 
two squares are exactly the same colour, meaning that the wavelengths of light 
reflected by those squares are identical when they enter your eye. Since colour 
is highly dependent on lighting, mechanisms in your visual system correct for 
brightness context (Xing et al., 2015) in order to determine the true colour of the 
object. While this usually results in more accurate colour perception, this mechanism 
can at times lead to incorrect inferences about the true colour of an object. In this 
case, the illusion is so strong that visual proof – the squares connected by lines of 
the same colour (Figure 1.1B) – is required to accept it!
Modulations of perception by prior knowledge
Already over a century ago, Helmholtz questioned the idea of passive perception, 
casting it instead as an intrinsically inferential process wherein past experiences 
are used to make sense of incoming sensory information. Indeed, as just 
demonstrated in Figure 1.1A, our perception can often differ markedly from the 
information contained in the sensory signal alone. The knowledge that the brain 
has learnt about the world through past experience is thought to be contained in 
a collection of priors – ‘prior’ in the sense that in the absence of any sensory input, 
certain things are more likely to occur and therefore a priori expected. For example, 
we have learnt that distance causes things to appear smaller than they are up 
close, and due to this prior knowledge, our interpretation of size can be profoundly 
influenced by depth cues. In Figure 1.1C, you may experience the illusion that the 
rightmost soldier is larger than his companions – however all three soldiers are 
identical in size. The rightwards converging lines in the background of Figure 1.1C 
suggest that the rightmost soldier is farther away, which makes him appear larger. 
In another example, the circles on the left of Figure 1.1D probably appear as bumps 
that protrude out of the page towards you, whereas the circles on the right likely 
appear as dimples that recede into the page, away from you. However, the circles 
on the left are just 180° rotations of the circles on the right – if you turn this book 
upside down, the dimples will turn to bumps and vice versa! From experience in the 
world, we know that the most likely source of light is from above (i.e., the sun), and 
therefore developed a ‘light from above’ prior (Adams et al., 2004a) that gives rise 
to the illusion in Figure 1.1D: if light is shining from the top of the page downwards, 
then a convex circle would have a shadow at its top edge and a convex circle would 
have a reflection.
 It is interesting to observe that knowledge of the ‘true’ visual input does not 
release the viewer from the illusory percepts displayed in Figure 1.1. You may find it 
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difficult, or impossible, to perceive the dots on the right of Figure 1.1D as bumps 
instead of dimples or to perceive all three solders as equally sized, despite knowing 
that they are! This demonstrates just how strong the influence of some priors on 
our perception can be. These examples demonstrate that perception is not a 
passive process, but instead that it is shaped by what we have learnt about the 
world.
Forming Expectations
While these examples may leave you with the impression that our brains are open 
to deception or trickery, applying prior knowledge to interpret incoming sensory 
information conveys large advantages. By constraining the hypothesis space, 
it enables the brain to form more efficient and accurate representations of 
the outside world. For example, when an object is presented in its usual context 
(i.e. a bicycle on a sidewalk) it is recognised more accurately and more quickly than 
when this context is scrambled (Biederman, 1972), and placing objects in unusual 
configurations or size relations to each other has the same impeding effect upon 
behaviour (Biederman et al., 1982). Making predictions about our environment 
improves processing efficiency and enables us to quickly infer properties that are 
ambiguous from the two-dimensional sensory input alone, as size, distance, and 
colour often are. Furthermore, it improves performance in the face of noisy or 
weak signals, such as the ability to navigate during a rainstorm or make our way 
through a darkened room, and allows us to infer the presence of objects that are 
difficult to detect or are occluded from view (and thus imperceptible from sensory 
information alone). Such inference is possible because past experience creates 
expectations about what sorts of things are likely to occur in the environment, 
which then can be used to guide and bias the interpretation of subsequent sensory 
input.
 There are a number of ways in which the brain is able to form expectations 
about what is likely in the environment, all of which involve statistical learning at 
their core. Certain objects are more frequently encountered than others, and 
therefore more probable. If someone is pointing at the sky, it is more likely they are 
trying to draw your attention to an airplane or a bird than to a blimp or a bat. Other 
objects tend to come together, such that one predicts the presence of the other. 
When you hear a siren, you often see a vehicle with flashing lights moving quickly 
through the traffic. Finally, there is a high level of constancy in our visual scene, 
such that objects and features do not rapidly vary from one moment to the next. 
If you look up from this page to your surroundings, you will likely find that the 
majority of the scene has remained the same as the last time you looked at it – and 
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if you did find that an object had suddenly appeared or disappeared, this would be 
quite alarming! Based on the high degree of temporal autocorrelation in the 
environment, the brain forms a prior that the world is generally stable over short 
timescales. I investigate the perceptual and neural effects of this prior in Chapter 2.
 Once these expectations have been formed, they modulate neural responses 
to sensory information at very early stages of processing. Neuroimaging experiments 
have demonstrated that expected items are processed with fewer resources than 
unexpected items (Murray et al., 2002; Alink et al., 2010; Meyer and Olson, 2011; 
Kok et al., 2012a). This reduction in neural activity to the same stimulus when it is 
expected compared to when it is unexpected is commonly referred to as expectation 
suppression (ES; Todorovic and De Lange, 2012). The reduced response to expected 
stimuli occurs whether expectations were induced via base rate occurrence 
(Summerfield et al., 2008; Larsson and Smith, 2012) or conditional probability (Den 
Ouden et al., 2009; Arnal et al., 2011; Kok et al., 2012a). However, whether or not 
such expectation suppression occurs depends on several factors, which I outline 
below.
Which factors influence whether the brain uses 
predictive information?
The brain is constantly forming hypotheses about the causes of its sensory input, 
and weighing the evidence for the different hypotheses against each other. Imagine 
that you are entering your bedroom late one evening, and discover that the light 
switch by the door does not work. As you go to turn on the bedside lamp, you 
startle – there is a cat curled up on your bed, but you have no pets! In the light, the 
‘cat’ is revealed to be your discarded pyjamas, fallen in just the right way to resemble 
a curled body and tail. This type of hallucination is common, especially when light 
is low. The folds and bumps in the pyjamas and their position on the bed temporarily 
had more in common with previous experiences with cats than with clothing, and 
therefore offered more evidence for the ‘cat’ hypothesis, reflected in a brief 
hallucination. Like in the case of the illusions pictured in Figure 1.1, hallucinations 
result from the priors we use to make sense of the world. Importantly, the input 
supported this hypothesis only because of the poor lighting conditions – as soon 
as the light came on, the true cause of the input was revealed. This is in line with 
the idea that perception is most strongly influenced by prior knowledge when 
sensory input is noisy or ambiguous. In other words, when sensory input is clear, 
there is less need to rely on previous experience with the world in order to tell what 
we are looking at. However, when input is noisy or ambiguous, sensory expectations 
facilitate perceptual inference (Bar, 2004). Indeed, many theories of perception 
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hold that sensory input should be weighted according to its reliability (Mumford, 
1992; Rao and Ballard, 1997; Knill and Pouget, 2004; Friston, 2009a), such that 
priors have a larger influence when sensory input is weak or ambiguous, but little 
or no influence when sensory input is strong and clear. In Chapter 4, I manipulated 
the strength of visual input in order to investigate whether there was evidence for 
an increased reliance on prior information when sensory information was weak, 
compared to when it was strong.
 Apart from differences in the sensory signals themselves, the influence of priors 
may also depend on differences in the cognitive state of the observer. For example, 
when the stimulus/object that you are able to form expectations about (e.g., a disk 
flying through the air) is relevant to the task you are doing (e.g., playing Frisbee), 
the brain may capitalize on its ability to predict what is about to happen. Contrast 
this to the situation where you are having a picnic on the grass: here the brain 
may only make use of the ability to predict the irrelevant stimulus when there is 
a specific benefit of doing so (such as a need to suppress distracting information, 
or to duck when the disk comes flying at you). In general, most research on the 
effects of expectation on neural processing tends to focus on task-relevant stimuli, 
such that predictive cues signal features of the stimuli that participants need to 
respond to. I investigate whether an observer’s specific requirements change how 
the brain responds to expected or predictable stimuli in the environment in 
Chapters 3 and 5.
Overview of this thesis
The aim of the work described in this thesis was to investigate the effects of 
expectation on sensory processing. I approached this question by probing the 
response of visual areas of the brain using functional magnetic resonance imaging 
(fMRI), a neuroimaging technique that provides an indirect measure of neural 
activity within different brain areas with high spatial specificity.
 In Chapter 2, I examined how recent perceptual history influences how sub- 
sequent stimuli are perceived and processed by visual brain regions. Earlier research 
had demonstrated that perception is biased towards recently seen stimuli, such 
that perception is not fully determined by the currently presented stimulus, but 
also influenced by the stimuli that preceded it (Fischer and Whitney, 2014). This 
effect can be understood to result from a natural prior that the environment is 
generally stable over short timescales, given the high amount of autocorrelation 
commonly displayed by objects in the world. In a recent demonstration of this, 
Fischer & Whitney (2014) judge orientations of line segments, and found that 
participants perceived the orientations to be more similar to the orientation of 
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the previous stimulus than they really were. What is happening in the brain when 
perception is influenced by recently seen stimuli? Does the stimulus from the 
previous trial influence how the stimulus on the current trial is represented in 
visual areas of the brain? We addressed this question by measuring neural activity 
in visual cortex using fMRI while participants performed an orientation-judgment 
task. Our results suggest a direct neural correlate of stimulus history effects in 
visual cortex – to our knowledge, the first reported neural effect of perceptual 
history.
 Chapter 2 focused on a natural prior – one that is learnt through normal 
experience with the autocorrelation present in people’s environment over the 
course of their lives. These long term, natural priors are still flexible, and can be 
adjusted through exposure to different environment properties (Adams et al., 
2004b; Sotiropoulos et al., 2011). However, it is also possible to form new priors 
relatively quickly and flexibly, and Chapters 3-5 investigated priors that were 
obtained in the laboratory. In these experiments, I induced simple, artificial priors 
by pairing the orientation of visual stimuli to auditory tones of specific frequencies. 
Participants saw stimuli containing oriented lines of one of two orientations, 
leftward tilted or rightward tilted. In Chapter 3, each visual stimulus was preceded 
by an auditory tone that either cued the orientation of the upcoming stimulus with 
100% validity, or provided no information about the orientation of the upcoming 
stimulus (50% validity). This allowed me to compare neural activity in response to 
stimuli that were fully predicted to stimuli for which a precise expectation of 
orientation could not be formed. In Chapters 4 and 5, we made a slight adjustment 
to how we cued participants that allowed us to investigate what happens when 
predictions are violated: cues were 75% valid, meaning that a quarter of the time 
participants’ orientation expectation was invalid.
 In Chapter 3, I investigated the effect of task-set on the neural response to 
predictable and non-predictable stimuli, to evaluate the automaticity of expectation 
effects. We used three tasks: one in which the cued stimulus was relevant, and two 
that diverted attention away from the cued stimulus by either a perceptual or 
working memory task on stimuli presented elsewhere on the screen. We found a 
reduced response to stimuli during predictable compared to non-predictable 
blocks during the distracting perceptual task, but not during the other two tasks. 
These results suggest that expectation suppression is not an automatic 
phenomenon, but dependent on attentional state and type of available cognitive 
resources.
 In Chapter 4, I investigated the hypothesis that priors have a larger influence 
on sensory processing when sensory input is weak, as described in the example of 
the cat pyjamas, above. Here we manipulated the strength of the cued sensory 
input to investigate whether there is a larger effect of prior expectation on the 
17
INTRODUCTION
1
neural response in visual cortex when the strength of the sensory input is reduced. 
Our results supported this conclusion: expectation suppression was stronger for 
low contrast stimuli than high contrast stimuli. In other words, the effect of the 
prior was increased when the sensory input was weak, as would be expected when 
priors and sensory inputs are weighted by their relative reliability (Mumford, 1992; 
Rao and Ballard, 1997; Knill and Pouget, 2004; Friston, 2009a).
 In Chapter 4, the cued stimuli were task-relevant. In Chapter 5, I studied the 
automaticity of the effect that was found in the previous chapter – that expectation 
had more weight when the sensory input was weak. The same participants 
completed a second fMRI session with the same cues and stimuli, however here 
they performed a distracting task and the cued stimuli were irrelevant. In this 
context, the task-irrelevant stimuli evoked much less activity in visual cortex, and 
this activity was not modulated by expectation. These results suggest that the 
modulation of sensory processing by expectation may not always occur 
automatically, but may be influenced by task demands.
 Finally, in Chapter 6, I discuss how the empirical findings presented in this 
thesis contribute to our knowledge of how prior knowledge shapes the way the 
brain responds to its sensory environment.

This chapter has been published as: St. John-Saaltink E, Kok P, Lau HC & De Lange FP. 
(2016) Serial Dependence in Perceptual Decisions is Reflected in Activity Patterns in 
Primary Visual Cortex. Journal of Neuroscience 36(23): 6186-92.
Serial dependence in perceptual 
decisions is reflected in activity 
patterns in primary visual cortex
2
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Abstract
Sensory signals are highly structured in both space and time. These regularities 
allow expectations about future stimulation to be formed, thereby facilitating 
decisions about upcoming visual features and objects. One such regularity is that 
the world is generally stable over short time scales. This feature of the world is 
exploited by the brain, leading to a bias in perception called serial dependence: 
previously seen stimuli bias the perception of subsequent stimuli, making them 
appear more similar to previous input than they really are. What are the neural 
processes that may underlie this bias in perceptual choice? Does serial dependence 
arise only in higher-level areas involved in perceptual decision-making, or does 
such a bias occur at the earliest levels of sensory processing? In this study, human 
subjects made decisions about the orientation of grating stimuli presented in the 
left or right visual field while activity patterns in their visual cortex were recorded 
using fMRI. In line with previous behavioral reports, reported orientation on the 
current trial was consistently biased towards the previously reported orientation. 
We found that the orientation signal in V1 was similarly biased towards the 
orientation presented on the previous trial. Both the perceptual decision and 
neural effects were spatially specific, such that the perceptual decision and neural 
representations on the current trial were only influenced by previous stimuli at the 
same location. These results suggest that biases in perceptual decisions induced 
by previous stimuli may result from neural biases in sensory cortex induced by 
recent perceptual history.
21
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Introduction
The visual input we receive about the world is constantly interrupted by eye 
movements, blinks, and the occlusion of objects within our visual field. However, 
we perceive objects as continuous and the visual scene as stable. How is this 
stability obtained? One candidate mechanism for deriving stable representations 
from fluctuating noisy signals is temporal smoothing, i.e. the brain may generate 
a weighted average of current input with previously obtained input. This may be 
a beneficial strategy, given that the world is stable over short time scales (Dong and 
Atick, 1995). Indeed, perceptual judgments are known to be influenced by previous 
trial history (Gao et al., 2009; De Lange et al., 2013).
 Historically, priming is a classic example of how a previously seen stimulus 
can alter the response to a subsequent stimulus. When stimuli are physically (or 
conceptually) repeated, the behavioural response is facilitated. A set of recent 
studies also demonstrated strong serial dependence of perception between 
temporally adjacent stimuli, even for reliable (suprathreshold) visual stimuli that 
varied randomly over time (Cicchini et al., 2014; Fischer and Whitney, 2014; Liberman 
et al., 2014; Rahnev et al., 2015). In particular, remarkably, these recent studies 
show that previous stimuli can change – in other words, distort – perception.
 Here, we sought to clarify the neural mechanisms underlying this perceptual 
effect of recent stimulus history. On the one hand, it is conceivable that recent 
sensory input may change the sensitivity of sensory neurons, for example by 
increasing the sensitivity of neurons tuned to the previous input for a period of 
time following stimulus presentation (Fischer and Whitney, 2014). On the other 
hand, biases may only occur in downstream areas, at the stage of evidence 
accumulation and integration into a perceptual decision (Gold and Shadlen, 2007; 
Law and Gold, 2008; Hanks et al., 2011), leaving sensory processing unaffected. 
Here we examined whether serial dependence in visual perception is already 
manifest at the level of early sensory representations using an fMRI dataset in 
which subjects performed a perceptual decision task on the orientation of briefly 
presented grating stimuli. This allowed us to determine the influence of the 
previous stimulus on sensory representations in early visual cortex and perceptual 
report on the current trial. To preview, we found that sensory representations in 
early visual cortex were biased by the perceptual choice on the previous trial, in a 
spatially specific fashion. This suggests a potential sensory mechanism for serial 
dependence in visual perception.
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Materials and Methods
Participants
Twenty-seven healthy right-handed individuals (17 females, age 22 ± 2, mean ± 
standard deviation (SD)) with normal or corrected-to-normal vision gave written 
informed consent to participate in this study. Three participants did not complete 
the full fMRI session due to poor task performance or poor fixation ability, therefore 
data from twenty-four participants were used for analyses. Experimental procedures 
were approved by the local ethics committee (Commissie Mensgebonden Onder - 
zoek region Arnhem-Nijmegen, the Netherlands).
Stimuli
Stimuli consisted of two circular sinusoidal gratings (7° visual angle) presented for 
200 ms at 5° along the horizontal meridian to the left and right of a central fixation 
point. Gratings were oriented at 45° and 135° independently of each other, and 
had the same orientation on 50% of trials. Grating orientations were pseudo- 
randomized such that all four orientation combinations (clockwise (CW)/CW; counter-
clockwise (CCW)/CCW; CW/CCW; CCW/CW) occurred equally often. To increase 
task difficulty, grating stimuli were embedded in random noise at 80% contrast. 
The contrast of the grating within the stimulus was presented at two levels; the 
same contrast was used for both gratings within a trial. The stimuli (grating + noise) 
were normalized such that overall contrast and luminance were constant for high 
and low grating contrast values (all stimuli were 80% contrast). This meant that 
more of the overall stimulus contrast was driven by the grating for high contrast 
than for low contrast stimuli (mean grating contrast was ~5%). The central fixation 
point was displayed on a gray background throughout the experiment. Stimuli 
were generated using MATLAB (MathWorks, Natick, MA, US) in conjunction with 
Psychophysics Toolbox (Brainard, 1997). In the fMRI session, stimuli were displayed 
on a rear projection screen using a luminance-calibrated EIKI projector (60 Hz 
refresh rate, 1024 × 768 resolution) which participants viewed through a mirror. 
Stimuli were displayed on a LCD monitor (60 Hz refresh rate, 1024 × 768 resolution) 
during the behavioural session.
Experimental Design
Stimuli were presented in an event-related design, with 5-7 s between trials. On 
each trial, a stimulus display of two gratings was briefly presented between two 
500 ms periods of fixation (see Figure 2.1A). 700 ms after the onset of the stimulus 
display, two small chevrons pointing to the left or the right were presented for 1000 ms 
on either side of the fixation, which cued participants to respond to the grating that 
had been presented on that side of the screen. Participants performed a two- 
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alternative forced choice (2AFC) task on the orientation of the grating specified 
by the response cue, using two buttons (45°/135°) on an MR-compatible button box. 
Response contingency was counterbalanced across participants, and participants 
switched response hands halfway through the experiment.
 Each trial also contained a pre-cue that consisted of two additional, smaller 
chevrons on either side of fixation that pointed in the same direction as the 
post-cue on 75% of trials. The pre-cue remained on screen during the initial fixation 
display and the stimulus display (i.e., 700 ms). On trials in which an orientation 
response was given, two small ‘C’s appeared on either side of the fixation point 500 
ms after the offset of the response cue, to prompt participants to rate their 
perceptual confidence on a scale from one to four (using four buttons in their other 
hand). These aspects of the task were included to answer a different research 
question than the one addressed in the current paper. Therefore, in order to 
maximize the reliability of the estimation of the neural response, we collapsed over 
the congruency between the pre- and post-cues in all analyses presented here and for 
simplicity we display only the stimuli relevant to the current analysis in Figure 2.1.
Figure 2.1. Experimental paradigm.
A) Every 5-7 s, two noisy gratings independently oriented at either 45 or 135 degrees were 
presented. Participants reported the orientation of the grating indicated by a response cue. 
B) Analysis focuses on features of the current and previous trial.
Trial N-1 Trial N
Stimulus
Report
200 ms 500 ms
Response cue
1000 ms 2800-4800 ms
Stimulus display
500 ms
> >
A
B
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 Subjects participated in a behavioral session outside the scanner in the week 
before the fMRI session to familiarize subjects with the task and to titrate 
performance in the different conditions to 75% using a Quest staircase procedure 
(Watson and Pelli, 1983). During scanning, half of both congruent and incongruent 
trials were presented at low grating contrast, and the other half at high grating 
contrast, and contrast values were updated from the staircases after each block 
instead of after every trial. As mentioned above, we collapsed across cue-congruency 
and the different grating contrast levels in all analyses presented here.
 The task was split into two runs of four blocks each, for a total of 512 trials. 
Between the two task runs, participants practiced remapping their response hand 
(the hand for grating and confidence response were switched) during the 
anatomical scan. Two additional scans were carried out after the main experiment. 
A functional localizer was collected to enable identification of voxels that were 
maximally responsive to the grating stimuli in the left and right hemifield, and a 
retinotopy scan to allow delineation of early visual cortices. The localizer consisted 
of full contrast gratings that were identical in size and position to those in the main 
experiment. Gratings were flickered at one of the stimulus locations per trial, 
alternating between left and right hemifield, at 2 Hz for 23.4 s. Each orientation 
(45° or 135°) was presented four times per location in a pseudo-random order. To 
ensure fixation, participants’ task was to detect two letters (‘X’, ‘Z’) in a stream of 
letters within the fixation bull’s-eye. During the retinotopy scan, a flashing black-
and-white checkerboard pattern (3 Hz) in a 90 degree wedge rotated on a black 
background in 30 degree steps (1 position per TR). Participants’ task was to detect 
unpredictable changes in the colour of the central fixation point (white to black). 
Nine cycles of clockwise and counterclockwise rotation were presented. During 
both additional scans, participants responded to target events with a button press.
fMRI Acquisition Parameters
Functional images were acquired using a 3T Trio MRI system (Siemens, Erlangen, 
Germany) using a 32-channel head coil, with a T2*-weighted gradient-echo EPI 
sequence (TR 1.95 s, 31 transversal slices, 3 x 3 x 3 mm in-plane resolution, TE 30 
ms, field of view 192 mm x 192 mm, flip angle of 80). A high resolution anatomical 
image was collected using a T1-weighted MP-RAGE sequence (TR 2.3 s, TE 3.03 ms, 
1 x 1 x 1 mm in-plane resolution, GRAPPA acceleration factor of 2).
fMRI Data Preprocessing
Data were pre-processed using SPM8 (http://www.fil.ion.ucl.ac.uk/spm; Wellcome 
Trust Centre for Neuroimaging, London, UK). The first three volumes of each task 
run were discarded to allow for time to achieve initial equilibrium. Functional 
images from the two task runs, the localizer, and retinotopy runs were spatially 
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realigned to the mean image, and temporally realigned to the first slice of each 
volume. The motion parameters resulting from spatial realignment were included 
as nuisance regressors in the general linear models. The structural image was 
coregistered with the functional volumes.
fMRI Data Analysis
An initial analysis of the functional localizer data was performed using SPM8, with 
regressors for left hemifield stimulation, right hemifield stimulation, and the 
motion parameters resulting from spatial realignment. A 128 s high-pass filter 
removed low-frequency signal components. Subtraction of the response to left 
and right hemifield stimulation was used to select stimulus-responsive voxels in 
each hemisphere for further analysis. In a separate analysis, Freesurfer (surfer.
nmr.mgh.harvard.edu/) was used to inflate the cortical surface of each participant’s 
T1-weighted structural image and to analyze the functional data from the retinotopy 
session. Polar-angle maps were generated using Fourier-based methods and 
projected onto the surface of the inflated cortex according to established methods 
(Sereno et al., 1995), allowing retinotopic areas within early visual cortex to be 
visually identified and delineated. Freesurfer and SPM functions were used to 
convert the retinotopic labels from surface to volume space and to transform them 
into regions of interest (ROIs).
 Within retinotopic ROIs V1, V2, and V3 of each hemisphere, we restricted our 
analyses to the 50 voxels that were the most responsive to the localizer. To remove 
slow-drifts, preprocessed data from the localizer and task were linearly detrended. 
To estimate the response amplitude of each of these voxels to each single trial 
during the task, we applied the Least-Squares - Separate (LS-S) method outlined in 
Mumford et al. (2012) to the preprocessed data (Kok et al., 2013; Schoenmakers et 
al., 2014; Schlichting et al., 2015). This method consists of running a separate GLM 
for every trial, such that each trial is modeled once as a regressor of interest, with 
all other trials combined into a single nuisance regressor. This method has been 
shown to improve the estimation of single-trial BOLD response, compared to a 
GLM with one regressor for each trial (Mumford et al., 2012). In addition to these 
regressors, we included separate regressors for break and end of run screens, as 
well as the motion parameters resulting from spatial realignment, their derivatives, 
and the square of these derivatives (i.e., 18 motion parameters in total). The data 
from the functional localizer were analyzed similarly using the LS-S method, with 
one GLM performed per trial. The resulting task and localizer beta weights were 
normalized by z-scoring the values for each voxel.
 For the main analyses, we first computed an orientation-specific signal for 
each trial by training a support vector machine (SVM) on the localizer data per 
hemisphere, and applying these SVMs to the task data in order to produce an SVM 
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decision value for each task trial. We used the SVM decision value as a proxy for 
orientation-signal strength. To maximize the strength of this orientation signal, 
we determined the optimal number of voxels for each participant and each ROI. 
To do so, we calculated the mean orientation signal over all task trials for different 
numbers of voxels (5 to 50, in steps of 5) and selected the number of voxels at 
which the mean orientation signal peaked. We applied Platt Scaling (Platt, 2000) to 
transform SVM outputs to probabilities by passing them through a sigmoid 
(Niculescu-Mizil and Caruana, 2005; Charles et al., 2014).
Serial Dependence Analyses (behaviour and fMRI)
For all following analyses, orientation was re-coded such that 45° was positive and 
135° was negative. First, we constructed four regressors that captured, for each 
trial, the stimulus orientation at the responded to and non-responded to locations, 
on both trial N and trial N-1 (refer to Figure 2.2A). We applied logistic regression 
to participants’ binary perceptual choice to characterize the impact of current 
and previous stimuli on current perceptual choice. Parameter estimates indicate 
the extent to which the perceptual report on trial N is influenced by the stimulus 
orientations presented at each location on the current and previous trial. To 
 correspondingly characterize the impact of current and previous stimuli on the 
orientation signal in early visual areas, we applied linear regression to the 
orientation- specific BOLD signal (i.e., SVM output) in primary visual cortex (V1). 
 To investigate whether the serial effect is dependent upon the previous stimulus 
or the previous percept of that stimulus, we separately modeled the previous stimulus 
(the light blue bar in Figure 2.2B-C) depending on response: ‘correct’ when the 
previous percept was congruent with the previous stimulus; ‘incorrect’ when the 
previous percept was incongruent with the previous stimulus; and ‘non-responded 
to’ when the response was made to the stimulus at the other location. Using these 
three regressors in combination with the two regressors that captured the stimuli 
on the current trial, we again applied logistic regression to participants’ binary 
perceptual choice, and linear regression to the orientation signal in V1.
 For all analyses, we used simple t-tests at the group level to determine the 
robustness of each regressor’s influence. To assess the location-specificity of the 
effects, we used paired-sample t-tests at the group level to compare regressors for 
reported and non-reported locations, separately for current and previous trial. 
Likewise, paired-sample t-tests at the group level were used to compare the 
strength of the bias following correct and non-responded to stimuli, and correct 
and incorrect stimuli. Finally, to assess whether higher order extrastriate cortex 
displayed comparable serial dependence, we ran the same linear regression 
analyses performed in V1, separately for V2 and V3 ROIs.
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Control Analyses (fMRI)
Because we used an event-related design, with an average ITI of 6 s, a potential 
concern is that the serial dependence we find in the fMRI data could be attributed 
to BOLD from the previous trial that is yet to return to baseline. Although this 
concern is partially mitigated by the fact that all trials were modelled in the context 
of the GLM, which attributes only the unique variance to each regressor, we 
performed a conservative control analysis in which we explicitly modelled variations 
in hemodynamic effects of the previous trial during single trial beta estimation 
(i.e., the LS-S single trial GLMs, see above). Specifically, we captured any variation 
in the onset and duration of the BOLD response to the previous trial by modelling 
it with three complementary regressors: a canonical HRF and its first and second 
order derivatives. If the serial dependence effects in visual cortex reflect residual 
BOLD activity evoked by the previous stimulus, then the trial history effects should 
no longer be present when this signal is removed from the single trial estimates. 
We therefore repeated the two linear regression analyses presented above on 
these single trial estimates.
Persistence of serial dependence
In order to evaluate the temporal limit of serial dependence on the perceptual 
report, we investigated the influence of the preceding four trials on the current 
behavioural response. We constructed regressors capturing the stimulus orientation 
at the responded to and non-responded to locations on trial N-2, N-3, and N-4, and 
added them to the regressors for trials N and N-1 (refer to Figure 2.2A). We then 
repeated the logistic regression on participants’ binary perceptual choice. 
Results
We investigated an fMRI dataset collected while participants reported the orientation 
one of two visual grating stimuli briefly presented to the left and right of a central 
fixation point. On average, participants were 78% correct (± 5%) and responded 
after 595 ms (± 119 ms), indicating that participants followed task instructions.
 To characterize the impact of current as well as previous stimuli on perceived 
orientation, we applied logistic regression to participants’ binary perceptual choice. 
Similarly, in order to investigate the impact of current and previous stimuli on the 
orientation signal in early visual cortical areas, we extracted orientation specific 
BOLD signals from visual cortex on every trial, and applied linear regression to the 
orientation-specific BOLD signal.
 Perceived orientation was consistently biased towards the orientation of the 
preceding stimulus (t(23)=5.41, p = 1.7e-05; Figure 2.2B). This serial dependence 
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effect was spatially specific: perceptual decisions were more strongly influenced by 
previous stimuli at the same location than by stimuli at a different location (t(23)=5.34, 
p = 2.0e-05). In fact, perceived orientation on the current trial was slightly repelled 
away from the orientation of the previous stimulus at the other location (t(23)=-2.18, 
p = 0.040).
 Strikingly, the orientation signal in V1 was similarly biased towards the orientation 
presented on the previous trial (t(23)=3.21, p = 0.0039; Figure 2.2C), which suggests 
Figure 2.2.  Serial dependence effects on perceptual choice and orientation  
signal in V1. 
A) For each trial, four regressors captured the orientation of the stimuli at the responded to 
(blue) and non-responded to (red) locations, on both trial N and trial N-1. B-C) Parameter 
estimates for the four conditions indicated in A. Parameter estimates indicate how strongly 
perceptual re-port on trial N is influenced by the stimulus orientations presented at each 
location on the current and previous trial. B) Perceptual report on trial N is influenced by the 
orientation of the stimulus cued for report, but also by the previous stimulus presented at 
that location. C) The same as B but with the orientation signal in V1 (classifier output) as the 
dependent variable.
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that recently seen stimuli alter the low-level sensory representations of subsequent 
stimuli. Again, this effect was retinotopically specific, with a stronger influence by 
previous stimuli at the same location than by stimuli at the other location (t(23)=2.63, 
p = 0.015). V2 and V3 displayed the same pattern: the orientation signal was biased 
towards the orientation presented on the previous trial at the same location (V2: 
t(23)=2.08, p = 0.049; V3: t(23)=2.88, p = 0.0085). This effect was not present at the 
opposite location (V2: t(23)=0.65, p = 0.52; V3: t(23)=0.26, p = 0.79), although the 
difference between the two locations was not statistically significant in V2 (t(23)=0.63, 
p = 0.54) and only approached significance in V3 (t(23)=2.02, p = 0.056).
 Is the serial effect on perceptual choice and neural representation dependent 
upon the previous stimulus, or instead upon the previous percept? Most often, 
perception follows the stimulus, precluding such an analysis. However, trials in 
which perception diverges from stimulus input offer an opportunity to tease these 
factors apart. In the following, we will only consider effects of stimuli presented on 
previous trials at the same spatial location as the currently responded to stimulus, 
given the spatial specificity of the serial dependence effect demonstrated above. 
To investigate this question, we separately modeled the previous stimulus on the 
basis of the on perceptual report, resulting in regressors for ‘correct’, ‘incorrect, 
and ‘non-responded to’ trials (see Methods). As can be seen in Figure 2.3B, the 
perceptual decision on the current trial was consistently biased towards the 
previous stimulus when it was correctly perceived (t(23)=6.52, p = 1.2e-06), but 
biased away from the physically presented stimulus towards the perceived stimulus 
when stimulus and perceptual choice diverged on the previous trial (t(23)=-4.98, 
p = 4.9e-05), resulting in a significant difference between these conditions (t(23)=6.92, 
p = 4.7e-07). When no explicit perceptual decision was made on the previous 
stimulus (e.g. on the current trial the left grating was responded to, but on the 
previous trial the right grating was responded to), there was still a strong bias 
towards the previous stimulus (t(23)=4.91, p = 5.8e-05), ruling out an explanation of 
response bias. The bias towards the previous stimulus was stronger when it was 
correctly reported than when it was not responded to (t(23)=2.48, p = 0.021).
 The orientation signal decoded from BOLD activity in V1 displayed a similar 
profile, with a significant bias of orientation signals towards the previous stimulus 
when the previous stimulus was correctly perceived (t(23)=2.38, p = 0.026) or 
passively viewed (t(23)=2.30, p = 0.031) but no reliable effect when stimulus and 
choice diverged (t(23)=0.40, p = 0.69). This however did not culminate in a significant 
difference between correctly versus incorrectly responded trials (t(23)=0.51, p = 0.61), 
potentially due to the higher variability of the neural orientation signal compared 
to the behavioural report, in combination with the relatively low number of error 
trials (23% on average). There was no difference in the strength of the bias following 
correctly reported compared to non-reported stimuli (t(23)=0.71, p = 0.48). Again, a 
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similar pattern of results was found in V2 and V3, albeit non-significantly in V2. 
Orientation signals were biased towards previous stimuli when they were correctly 
perceived (V2: t(23)=1.05, p = 0.31; V3: t(23)=2.37, p = 0.027) or passively viewed (V2: 
t(23)=1.51, p = 0.14; V3: t(23)=2.45, p = 0.023), with no reliable effect when stimulus and 
choice could be dissociated (V2: t(23)=0.51, p = 0.62; V3: t(23)=1.54, p = 0.14).
Figure 2.3.  Serial dependence is governed by previous percept rather than 
stimulus or response.
A) The regressor for the stimulus on trial N-1 at the responded location on trial N (light blue 
in Figure 2.2B-C) was sub-divided on the basis of the perceptual decision on trial N-1: correct 
response (horizontal stripes), incorrect response (grid), responded to other location (no fill). 
B-C) Parameter estimates for the three conditions outlined in A. B) Previous stimuli that were 
correctly reported or not responded to exert a positive bias on current perception. For 
incorrect trials, percept-ion is biased towards previous percept rather than stimulus. C) The 
same as B, but with the orientation signal in V1 (classifier output) as the dependent variable. 
Here only the positive biases are present.
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 To ensure that our neural results were not dependent on residual BOLD signal 
from the evoked response to the previous stimulus, we modeled the neural 
response to the previous trial during the single trial beta estimation. If the serial 
dependence effects in visual cortex reflect left over BOLD activity evoked by the 
previous stimulus, then the trial history effects should no longer be present when 
this signal is removed from the single trial estimates. However, there was still a 
reliable effect of the previous stimulus on the current neural response in V1 
(t(23)=2.38, p = 0.026).
 To investigate how long the influence of previous trials persists, we looked at 
the influence of stimuli from the four preceding trials on the current perceptual 
report. There is a consistent positive bias towards the orientation of preceding 
stimuli from the preceding three trials (N-2: t(23)=5.10, p = 3.7e-05; N-3: t(23)=5.04, 
p = 4.2e-05), specific to stimuli at the location that is responded to on trial N (N-2: 
t(23)=5.19, p = 2.9e-05; N-3: t(23)=3.90, p = 0.00072; Figure 2.4). This bias drops off 
after three trials (N-4: t(23)=1.41, p = 0.17). Serial dependence of the orientation 
signal in visual cortex does not persist beyond the directly preceding trial (N-2: 
t(23)=0.77, p = 0.45), possibly due to the fact that the fMRI orientation signals were 
generally noisier than behaviour.
Figure 2.4.  The influence of previous trials on perceptual choice persists for three 
trials.
For this analysis, the orientation of the stimuli at the responded to (blue-green) and 
non-responded to (orange-yellow) locations on trial N-2, N-3 and N-4 were added to the 
regressors in Figure 2.2A. The positive bias of previous stimuli on the current perceptual 
report persisted for three trials.
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Discussion
Our perception at any given moment is influenced by both current and previous 
sensory signals. In this study, we investigated the neural mechanism underlying 
this serial dependence in perceptual decisions. Through extracting orienta-
tion-specific signals from visual cortex, we determined that the attractive bias 
exerted by the previous percept is present at the level of early sensory representa-
tions. This result sheds light on the mechanism behind the serial dependencies 
that have been reported in the literature, such as that choice on a current trial is 
influenced by the directly preceding stimulus (Gao et al., 2009; De Lange et al., 
2013; Fischer and Whitney, 2014).
 What specifically is carried over from one trial to the next? We distinguish three 
possibilities. First, serial dependence could be driven by the previous stimulus, 
via the bottom-up signal. Another option is that the perceptual choice made on 
the basis of the previous stimulus is carried over to the next trial. The crucial 
distinction according to this explanation is that serial dependence is more 
attributable to the percept of the previous stimulus than the previous stimulus per 
se. The third possibility is that serial dependence relies on the behavioural response 
that is coupled to the perceptual choice. In this explanation, the serial effect is 
motoric (as opposed to sensory or perceptual) in nature.
 If serial dependence is driven by the bottom-up input, then there should be 
a consistent influence of previous stimuli based on their orientation. This is indeed 
what we found: there was a reliable bias towards the orientation of previous stimulus 
presented at the same location. However, perceptual choice is highly correlated to 
sensory input, i.e., generally our perceptual experience of the world is a good 
reflection of the stimulation received by our sensory cortices. This makes it difficult 
to determine whether it is the bottom-up signal, or the perceptual choice, that 
carries over across trials. Because the orientation task used here was deliberately 
difficult (the contrast of the orientation signal within the noisy stimulus patches 
was titrated such that participants were 75% correct; the gratings were on average 
5% contrast in 80% contrast noise), it resulted in a proportion of trials in which 
stimulus and choice diverged. These trials allow us to dissociate perceptual choice 
from the sensory input. On these trials, subsequent perceptual decision was 
biased towards the previous (incorrect) perceptual choice, instead of the stimulus 
that was presented (see Figure 2.3B). Furthermore, the attractive bias elicited by 
the previous trial was stronger following a correct perceptual choice than when the 
stimulus was not responded to. This suggests that perception – as opposed to 
sensory input per se – is what is carried over across time, exerting a positive bias 
on subsequent perceptual decisions.
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 If, on the other hand, the behavioural response (i.e., the button that was 
pressed) is carried over between trials, one would expect serial dependence to be 
location unspecific – i.e., if pressing button 1 would prime a subsequent button 1 
response, this would not be localized to one visual hemifield, but would instead 
transfer across stimulus locations (as response location was randomized over 
trials). However, all effects of previous stimuli on both perceptual report and 
orientation signal in this study were location specific (see Figure 2.2B), which rules 
out that simple motor response biases were responsible for our results. For the 
same reason, this rules out non-specific decision-biases, such as a predisposition 
to report the same orientation repeatedly, and instead suggests a spatially specific 
perceptual carry-over.
 The current results are in line with other recent reports suggesting a perceptual 
nature of serial dependence (Burr and Cicchini, 2014; Cicchini et al., 2014; Fischer 
and Whitney, 2014; Liberman et al., 2014). It should be noted that perceptual 
decisions in this experiment were measured using a 2AFC task, which can be 
contrasted with the more continuous measures of perception used in these 
previous reports. Given that it is necessarily less fine-grained, a binary measure of 
perception may be less sensitive to subtle perceptual biases. However, because 
the oriented gratings in our stimuli were low contrast, embedded in high contrast 
white noise which contains signal for all possible orientations, it is feasible that 
small (serial dependence) biases would lead to the false perception of the 
orthogonal grating orientation (Pajani et al., 2015). Since in the current study 
participants were presented with only two (orthogonal) orientations, the biases 
reported here likely reflect carry-over of perceptual decisions about whether the 
grating was oriented clockwise (45 degrees) or counterclockwise (135 degrees), 
rather than subtle perceptual biases on the order of a few degrees such as those 
previously described in continuous-report designs (Fischer and Whitney, 2014). 
A paradigm which combines a continuous measure of perception with a neuro - 
imaging measure of stimulus representations in low-level sensory cortices, such as 
one in which neural correlates of subtle perceptual biases have previously been 
measured (Kok et al., 2013), could be a promising avenue for future investigation of 
serial dependence.
 What may be the neural mechanisms underlying the serial dependence of 
perceptual choice? One hypothesis is that the sensitivity of sensory neurons tuned 
to the previous percept may be increased for a brief period following stimulus 
presentation, thereby influencing current perception (Fischer and Whitney, 2014). 
In line with this idea, we found that the orientation of the previous perceptual 
decision biases the representation of stimuli in early visual cortex. Interestingly, 
similar effects of the decision variable on sensory responses have been observed 
during the period in which a perceptual decision unfolds (Nienborg and Cumming, 
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2009; Wimmer et al., 2015). We speculate that this biasing of sensory responses 
due to the decision may persist, thereby biasing subsequent sensory processing.
 Notably, we found that non-reported gratings also have an influence on the 
subsequent perceptual decision and orientation signal in visual cortex. While this 
result could be seen as evidence for the stimulus-driven account of serial 
dependence, it should be borne in mind that non-reported gratings were still 
attentively perceived by the participants. Namely, subjects were only informed 
about which stimulus to report after the stimuli had been removed from the screen, 
therefore necessitating an implicit perceptual decision about both stimuli.
 The effects in primary visual cortex and in perceptual report were spatially 
specific: perceptual decisions and neural representations on the current trial were 
only influenced by previous stimuli at the same location. This was equally true of 
the influence that stimuli from two and three trials back had on the perceptual 
report. This location-specificity may appear at odds with a previous report (Fischer 
and Whitney, 2014), in which serial dependence transferred across spatial locations 
(i.e., that serial dependence smoothes across time and space). One explanation for 
this could be due to differences in participants’ attentional state between the two 
designs: when serial dependence was found to transfer across locations, only one 
stimulus was attended on each trial, whereas in the current study, both stimuli 
required a certain level of attention since either stimulus could be cued for report. 
Future designs that manipulate both the number of attended stimuli and total 
number of stimuli may elucidate the cause of this discrepancy.
 A potential limitation of the present study is the possibility that the serial 
dependence we measured in visual cortex is a result of a residual BOLD response 
to the previous stimulus. However, there are several reasons why we believe that 
our results are not the result of autocorrelation in the BOLD signal. First, in order 
to increase the separability of single trials, the interval between trials was jittered 
such that trials were presented every 5-7 s. Second, each trial was independently 
modeled using a technique which maximizes extraction of the signal unique to 
each trial (Mumford et al., 2012). This approach to estimating the trial-specific 
BOLD signal, in combination with the jitter between trials, should allow the signal 
from individual trials to be dissociated from neighbouring trials. Furthermore, 
the serial dependence in visual cortex persisted even after we applied a conservative 
approach to regress out the BOLD response to the previous trial. Therefore, 
it appears plausible that the bias in sensory cortex is generated at the moment of 
bottom-up stimulation, rather than reflecting a spill-over of activity to the previous 
stimulus.
 Our perception of the world is partly determined by our (often implicit) priors 
about the statistical regularities in the environment (Yuille and Kersten, 2006; 
Chalk et al., 2010; Kok et al., 2013). Serial dependence, such as reported here, can 
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be understood as one such prior – that the world is stable over short time scales. 
Interestingly, serial dependence is not restricted to low-level stimuli such as used 
here, but also extends to complex and naturalistic stimuli such as faces (Liberman 
et al., 2014) and numerosity (Cicchini et al., 2014). Other sequential effects such as 
repetition suppression may similarly be cast as the result of this same prior 
(Summerfield et al., 2008; Todorovic et al., 2011; Henson, 2015): if the world is 
generally stable, objects are more likely to repeat than change. Given the stability 
of the sensory world, such a prior could make visual processing more robust by 
filtering out temporal noise.

This chapter has been published as: St. John-Saaltink E, Utzerath C, Kok P, Lau HC, 
& De Lange FP (2015) Expectation suppression in early visual cortex depends on 
task set, PLoS ONE 10(6), e0131172.
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Abstract
Stimulus expectation can modulate neural responses in early sensory cortical regions, 
with expected stimuli often leading to a reduced neural response. However, it is 
unclear whether this expectation suppression is an automatic phenomenon or is 
instead dependent on the type of task a subject is engaged in. To investigate this, 
human subjects were presented with visual grating stimuli in the periphery that 
were either predictable or non-predictable while they performed three tasks 
that differently engaged cognitive resources. In two of the tasks, the predictable 
stimulus was task-irrelevant and spatial attention was engaged at fixation, with a 
high load on either perceptual or working memory resources. In the third task, the 
predictable stimulus was task-relevant, and therefore spatially attended. We observed 
that expectation suppression is dependent on the cognitive resources engaged 
by a subjects’ current task. When the grating was task-irrelevant, expectation 
suppression for predictable items was visible in retinotopically specific areas of 
early visual cortex (V1-V3) during the perceptual task, but it was abolished when 
working memory was loaded. When the grating was task-relevant and spatially 
attended, there was no significant effect of expectation in early visual cortex. These 
results suggest that expectation suppression is not an automatic phenomenon, 
but dependent on attentional state and type of available cognitive resources.
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Introduction
Stimulus expectation can modulate neural responses in early sensory cortical 
regions, with expected stimuli often leading to a reduced neural response (Murray 
et al., 2002; Meyer and Olson, 2011). This effect has been found in visual (Summerfield 
et al., 2008; Meyer and Olson, 2011; Kok et al., 2012a) and auditory (Arnal et al., 2011; 
Todorovic et al., 2011) cortices, and in both electrophysiological (Meyer and Olson, 
2011; Todorovic et al., 2011) and haemodynamic (Summerfield et al., 2008; Den 
Ouden et al., 2009; Kok et al., 2012a) measurements.
 Is expectation suppression an automatic process that happens outside the 
focus of attention? Several studies suggest that this is the case. A reduced neural 
response for predictable stimuli has been found during passive viewing (Alink et al., 
2010), as well as when stimuli are fully task irrelevant (Den Ouden et al., 2009), 
supporting the idea that suppression occurs automatically, whenever sensory 
input is predictable. In contrast to this notion however, other authors found no 
effect of expectation on sensory activity when stimuli were unattended (Larsson 
and Smith, 2012), suggesting that expected background stimuli are not automatically 
suppressed.
 One potential explanation for these conflicting results could be that the specific 
task set a subject is engaged in, and thereby the available resources, may determine 
whether stimulus expectations modulate the sensory response. For example, load 
theory (Lavie et al., 2004) states that the processing of task-irrelevant stimuli is 
determined by the type and level of resource load posed by a given task. In line 
with this, previous research has shown that task set can have a profound effect on 
the extent to which items in the visual background are processed (Yi et al., 2004; 
Lavie, 2005): irrelevant background stimuli tend to be suppressed during tasks that 
load perceptual resources, whereas there is no suppression for background stimuli 
when working memory is taxed. Therefore, expectation suppression of background 
stimuli might be especially pronounced during tasks with a high perceptual (but 
not working memory) load. Critically, in support of this idea, the study which found 
that predictable background stimuli were not suppressed by expectation used 
a paradigm that loaded working memory resources (Larsson and Smith, 2012).
 Therefore, in the current study we asked whether expectation suppression for 
background stimuli depends on the type of available resources. To investigate this, 
we compared the neural response to predictable and non-predictable visual 
background stimuli during tasks that placed a higher load on either perceptual or 
working memory resources. If task set interacts with the expectation effect, this 
would indicate that expectation suppression is dependent on how processing 
resources are engaged by the task at hand. Conversely, if no such interaction is 
present, this would indicate that expectation suppression is independent of the 
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type of available resources. To compare the effect of spatial attention, we included 
a task that made the background stimulus task-relevant. Due to previous reports 
of expectation suppression for task-relevant, spatially-attended stimuli, we 
hypothesized that predictable stimuli would be suppressed relative to non-pre-
dictable stimuli during this task. With this design we aimed to elucidate the 
conditions for which sensory input is suppressed by expectation.
Materials and Methods
Participants
Thirty-five healthy right-handed individuals (25 females, age 22 ± 4, mean ± 
standard deviation (SD)) with normal or corrected-to-normal vision gave written 
informed consent to participate in this study. Experimental procedures were 
approved by the local ethics committee (Commissie Mensgebonden Onderzoek 
region Arnhem-Nijmegen, the Netherlands). Data from two subjects were excluded 
due to chance level performance on one or more of the tasks.
Stimuli
Stimuli were generated using MATLAB (MathWorks, Natick, MA, US) in conjunction 
with Psychophysics Toolbox (Brainard, 1997). In the behavioural session, stimuli 
were displayed on a Samsung SynchMaster 940BF monitor (60 Hz refresh rate, 
1280 X 1024 resolution). In the fMRI session, stimuli were displayed on a rear 
projection screen using a luminance-calibrated EIKI projector (60 Hz refresh rate, 
1024 X 768 resolution) which participants viewed through a mirror. A fixation 
“bull’s-eye” (outer ring 0.8° of visual angle) was presented at the centre of a gray 
background throughout each task. On each trial, a grating annulus (outer diameter: 
15° of visual angle; inner diameter: 2°) of luminance-defined sinusoids at 80% 
contrast was displayed around the fixation bull’s-eye (200 ms; 3 3.1A). Gratings 
were oriented at either 45° or 135°, with a phase randomly selected from 10 
possibilities, evenly spaced between pi and 2pi. To mitigate afterimages, the phase 
of the grating was inverted halfway through stimulus presentation. On each trial, 
gratings had one of two possible spatial frequencies (mean: 1.5 cpd), with the 
specific spatial frequency values set for each individual by a staircasing procedure 
(see below). Simultaneously with the grating presentation, coloured letters were 
presented in the centre of the fixation bull’s-eye, with noise of the same colour 
superimposed (Figure 3.1B). Six letters (A, H, N, R, T, Z) and six colours (red, blue, 
green, cyan, yellow, magenta) were used. The number of coloured pixels that 
degraded the letters was similarly set by a staircasing procedure. The titration of 
these stimulus parameters for each subject ensured that tasks were matched on 
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difficulty. Auditory cues that were played before each stimulus consisted of four 
pure tones (329, 440, 493 and 659 Hz) that were played for 200 ms.
Figure 3.1.  Experimental paradigm. 
A) During each of the three tasks, stimuli were presented in predictable and non-predictable 
blocks, alternating every 12 trials. Each trial started with an auditory tone that either perfectly 
predicted the orientation of the subsequent grating stimulus (45° or 135°), or carried no 
orientation information. B) Participants performed two tasks on the stimuli in the fixation 
bull’s-eye. During the perceptual task, targets were 1-back letter repetitions (the magenta ‘N’ 
is a target) that were difficult to perceive due to added noise. During the working memory 
task, targets were 2-back colour repetitions (the blue ‘H’ is a target) that were easy to perceive 
(as the whole inner ring has the same colour) but taxed the working memory system more 
strongly than the 1-back task. During the grating task, participants responded to the spatial- 
frequency of the grating stimuli. Targets had lower spatial-frequency than non-targets. 
C) Pairing between auditory tones and grating orientations. In predictable blocks, tones 
predicted grating orientation with 100% accuracy. In non-predictable blocks, the tones 
provided no orientation information. ITI = inter-trial interval.
100%
Predictable Non-predictable
100%
50%
50%
WM task:
“Same colour as 2-back?”
Tone
200 ms
Fixation
300 ms
Stimulus display
200 ms
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650-950 ms
Perceptual task:
“Same letter as 1-back?”
Predictable
block. . . . . .
Non-predictable
block
Predictable
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Non-predictable
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Grating task:
“Grating with thick lines?”
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Experimental Design
To maximize sensitivity to the effects of predictability, stimuli were presented in a 
block design. On each trial, an auditory tone was presented 500 ms before the 
onset of the visual stimulus display. These auditory tones contained predictive 
information about upcoming visual stimuli, similar to previous studies (Den Ouden 
et al., 2009; Den Ouden et al., 2010; Kok et al., 2012a; Kok et al., 2013; Kok et al., 
2014). During predictable blocks, the auditory tones cued the orientation of the 
upcoming grating with 100% validity. During non-predictable blocks, the auditory 
tones provided no orientation information (50% validity; Figure 3.1C). Then, the 
stimulus display was presented, which consisted of both the grating annulus and 
the degraded coloured letter at fixation. The stimulus display remained on screen 
for 200 ms (see Figure 3.1A), followed by an inter-trial interval jittered between 650 
and 950 ms. We reasoned that including this jitter between trials would increase 
the pairing between tones and gratings within trials(which had a fixed temporal 
distance of 500 ms), relative to stimuli across trials. Hereby we aimed to increase 
the salience of the predictable statistical structure of the tone-orientation pairings. 
Cue validity alternated every 12 trials (18 s), with one trial presented on average 
every 1.5 s (range 1.35-1.65 s). Using cross-modal cues to manipulate conditional 
probabilities has advantages over inducing expectations by manipulating base rate 
occurrence of stimuli, since the latter could cause differences in stimulus-specific 
adaptation (Krekelberg et al., 2006; Solomon and Kohn, 2014).
 We manipulated task set while diverting spatial attention away from the grating 
stimuli by loading either perceptual resources or working memory resources at the 
fovea (see Figure 3.1B). Following the study of Yi et al. (2004), we induced a high 
working memory load by a 2-back task on easy to perceive stimuli, whereas a high 
perceptual resource load was induced by a 1-back task on visually degraded stimuli. 
Instead of manipulating the level of resource load, we elected to use only high load 
conditions with carefully titrated stimuli to match performance, so as to facilitate a 
direct comparison between the different types of load (rather than the amount of 
load). During the perceptual task, participants responded to the degraded letters 
within the fixation bull’s-eye: a letter was a target if it was the same as during the 
previous stimulus display (1-back task). This task was perceptually challenging 
because the letters were occluded by noise of the same colour, making them 
difficult to identify. During the working memory task, participants responded to the 
colour of the letters and noise pixels within the fixation bull’s-eye: a colour was a 
target if it was the same as the stimulus display presented two trials ago (2-back 
task). The 2-back task required participants to encode, maintain and compare 
more items in working memory than the 1-back task, and thereby it placed a higher 
load on working memory. We also included a task in which attention was directed 
to the grating. During this task, participants responded to the spatial-frequency of 
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the grating stimuli: low-spatial frequency gratings were targets. Therefore, the 
predictable grating stimuli could be either unattended with a load on perceptual 
resources (letter task); unattended with a load on working memory resources 
(colour task); or attended and task-relevant (grating task). For all tasks, participants 
were instructed to respond after every trial by indicating ‘target’ (button 1) or 
non-target (button 2). Each task had the same proportion of targets (33%), and 
participants were instructed to maintain fixation during all tasks.
 Per scanner run of 5.4 min, participants performed 14 blocks of one of the 
tasks, with four fixation blocks interspersed. During fixation blocks, only the bull’s 
eye was presented and participants were instructed to maintain fixation. Stimulus 
sequences were repeated for three runs such that each task was performed on the 
same stimuli. Participants cycled through the tasks until each had been performed 
three times, yielding 504 trials per task. Task order was counterbalanced across 
participants. Feedback (target accuracy (%), number of timeouts to targets, 
non-target accuracy (%), and number of timeouts to non-targets) was displayed for 
2 s at the end of every run.
 After the main experiment, we carried out two additional scans: one to identify 
voxels that were maximally responsive to the grating stimulus and one to retinoto-
pically delineate early visual cortices. During the grating localizer, full contrast 
gratings of the same size and position as the main experiment were presented. 
Gratings were flickered at 2 Hz for 14.4 s at eight orientations (22.5, 45.0, 67.5, 90.0, 
112.5, 135.0, and 157.5 degrees). Each orientation was presented four times in a 
pseudo-random order. To ensure fixation, participants’ task was to detect two 
letters (‘X’, ‘Z’) in a stream of letters within the fixation bull’s-eye. During the 
retinotopy scan, a 90 degree wedge stimulus consisting of a flashing black-and-
white checkerboard pattern (3 Hz) rotated in 30 degree steps (1 position per TR) on 
a black background. Nine cycles of clockwise and counter clockwise rotation were 
presented. Participants’ task was to detect unpredictable changes in the colour of 
the central fixation point (white to black), which occurred four to eight times per 36 
s block. During both scans, participants responded to target events with a button 
press.
Behavioural Session
To familiarize participants with the tasks and to ensure all tasks were equally 
difficult, stimuli were calibrated prior to the scanning session. Participants were 
explicitly taught the relationships between the informative tones and the grating 
orientations, and their knowledge of these relationships was explicitly tested at the 
beginning and the end of the training session as well as directly preceding the fMRI 
session. Participants were trained on the working memory task until they could 
achieve better than 60% target accuracy on one run of this task (using identical 
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presentation parameters to the fMRI session). Participants who could not achieve 
this performance were excluded from further participation. The stimuli from the 
perceptual and grating tasks were adjusted using an adaptive staircase-procedure 
(Watson and Pelli, 1983) set to the accuracy that the participant attained on the 
working memory task. First, accuracy on the perceptual task was manipulated by 
adjusting the number of coloured noise pixels surrounding the letter. Then, 
accuracy on the grating task was manipulated by adjusting the difference between 
high and low spatial-frequency gratings (around a mean of 1.5 cpd). During both 
tasks, stimulus timing was identical to during the fMRI experiment, except that 
participants had the opportunity to pause every four blocks while stimulus 
parameters were updated according to the staircase value. This continued until the 
target accuracy was reached. This procedure matched performance on the 
different tasks within participants, while allowing differences in overall performance 
between participants. The behavioural session was held within seven days prior to 
the scanning session. Just before entering the scanner, participants were exposed 
to the relationship between the informative tones and the grating orientations with 
24 practice trials.
 To determine whether expectation or task had an effect on behaviour during 
the fMRI session, we performed a repeated measures ANOVA (rmANOVA) with 
factors expectation (predictable; non-predictable) and task (perceptual; WM; 
grating) on accuracy and RT. A main effect of task on RT was further investigated 
using post-hoc t-tests. Finally, to probe whether expectation had an effect when 
the predictable stimulus was attended and task-relevant, we compared accuracy 
and RT during predictable versus non-predictable blocks for the grating task using 
post-hoc t-tests.
fMRI Acquisition and Analysis
Functional images were acquired using a 3T Trio MRI system (Siemens, Erlangen, 
Germany) using a 32-channel head coil, with a 3D EPI sequence (TR 1.8 s, 64 
transversal slices, 2 x 2 x 2 mm in-plane resolution, TE 25 ms, field of view 224 mm 
x 224 mm, GRAPPA acceleration factor of 2). A high resolution anatomical image 
was collected using a T1-weighted MP-RAGE sequence (TR 2.3 s, TE 3.03 ms, 1 x 1 x 
1 mm in-plane resolution, GRAPPA acceleration factor of 2).
 Data were pre-processed using SPM8 (http://www.fil.ion.ucl.ac.uk/spm; Wellcome 
Trust Centre for Neuroimaging, London, UK). The first four volumes of each task 
run were discarded to allow for time to achieve initial equilibrium. Functional 
images from all sessions were spatially realigned to the mean image, and the 
resulting movement parameters, their first order derivatives and the square of 
these derivatives were included as nuisance regressors in the general linear model 
(GLM). The structural image was coregistered to the functional volumes.
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 Functional data from each subject were modelled using a block design 
approach, within the context of the General Linear Model (GLM) that included 
the data from all nine task runs. A 128 s high-pass filter removed low-frequency 
oscillations. Regressors for the task conditions were specified per run (180 scans), 
and convolved with SPM8’s canonical hemodynamic response function, which is 
comprised of the sum of two gamma functions. In addition to task regressors 
(predictable, non-predictable and fixation), the motion parameters as described 
above and a regressor to capture adaptation effects were included. The resulting 
beta-weights for predictable, non-predictable, and fixation for each run were analyzed 
in Matlab using in-house code. For each run, the fixation beta weight was used to 
normalize the beta-weights for predictable and non-predictable, and then the 
normalized betas were averaged across the three runs of each task. A separate 
design matrix was constructed for the grating localizer data, with regressors for 
stimulation, fixation, and the motion parameters (with derivatives as discussed 
above).
 Freesurfer (surfer.nmr.mgh.harvard.edu/) was used to inflate the cortical 
surface of each participant’s T1-weighted structural image and to analyze the 
functional data from the retinotopy session. Polar-angle maps were generated 
using Fourier-based methods and projected onto the surface of the inflated cortex 
according to established methods (Sereno et al., 1995), allowing retinotopic areas 
within early visual cortex to be visually identified and delineated. Freesurfer and 
SPM functions were used to convert the retinotopic labels from surface to volume 
space and to transform them into regions of interest (ROIs).
 Within these retinotopic ROIs of V1-V3, we averaged the task-related activity of 
the 150 voxels that were most responsive to the grating stimulus during the 
localizer. To test whether the effect of expectation was influenced by task demands, 
we performed an rmANOVA with factors expectation (predictable; non-predictable) 
and task (perceptual; WM; grating) on the normalized beta weights averaged per 
task. This rmANOVA was performed separately for each ROI. A main effect of task 
and an interaction between task and expectation were found. Because we wanted 
to investigate whether expectation suppression for background stimuli depends 
on the type of available resources, we compared the two fixation tasks directly, 
using an rmANOVA with factors expectation (predictable; non-predictable) and 
task (perceptual; WM) on the normalized beta weights averaged per task. To verify 
that the expectation effect also differed between the perceptual and grating tasks, 
we compared the expectation effects during these tasks with an rmANOVA with 
factors expectation (predictable; non-predictable) and task (perceptual; grating).
 To further examine the interactions, we performed post-hoc t-tests on the 
expectation effects for each task separately, within each ROI. These expectation 
effects were calculated by subtracting predictable from non-predictable beta 
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weights, such that positive values would indicate a lower response to predictable 
than non-predictable gratings (expectation suppression). We statistically evaluated 
the robustness of the effect using 150 voxels. Additionally, to assess whether the 
effect was stable across different voxel selection criteria, we calculated the 
expectation effect and the corresponding standard error of the mean (SEM) over a 
range of included voxels (50 to 300 voxels, in steps of 50 voxels).
 Additionally, to investigate neural activity modulations in areas outside early 
visual cortex, we performed a separate, whole-brain analysis. Preprocessing followed a 
similar pipeline, except that subjects’ T1 scans were normalized to MNI space. 
Functional images were brought into MNI space using the anatomical normalization 
parameters, and then smoothed with 8 mm kernel. The same GLM outlined above 
for the non-normalized images was applied to these data at the subject-level. 
The resulting beta weights were taken to a second (between- subjects) level, and 
tested using one-sample t-tests over linear combinations of the beta weights across 
subjects. To specifically test for areas showing the same resource- dependence of 
expectation suppression as found in the early visual cortex during the tasks at 
fixation, we specified a contrast to evaluate where there was greater expectation 
suppression during the perceptual task than the working memory task. Statistical 
inference was performed at the group-level using a cluster-level statistical test 
to assess clusters of significant activation (Friston et al., 1996). We used a familywise 
error (FWE) corrected cluster threshold of p < .05, with the spatial extent of clusters 
defined by a voxel threshold of p < .001 at the whole-brain level.
Results
Expectation suppression for unattended stimuli
Behaviour
Participants performed equally well on all three tasks (accuracy 85.6%, 87.8%, and 
87.9% for perceptual, WM, and grating tasks, respectively, rmANOVA over all tasks: 
F2,64=1.34, p = 0.27), demonstrating that participants followed task instructions 
and task difficulty was matched. There was no influence of grating predictability on 
either accuracy (rmANOVA over all tasks: F1,32=2.48, p = 0.13) or RT (rmANOVA over 
all tasks: F1,32=2.13, p = 0.15). There was a significant effect of task on RT (rmANOVA 
over all tasks: F2,64=23.45, p<0.001). Due to the additional time necessary for 
evidence accumulation of perceptually challenging stimuli, responses during the 
perceptual task (mean RT: 564 ms) were slower than during the grating task (mean 
RT: 524ms; t32=-4.21 p = 0.002), and grating task responses were slower than during 
the working memory task (mean RT: 504 ms, t32=2.22, p = 0.035). While valid 
expectations about task-relevant stimulus features often lead to behavioural 
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improvements, post-hoc t-tests on behavioural data from the grating task 
confirmed that there was no behavioural benefit of predictability on accuracy 
(t32=-1.03, p = 0.31) or RT (t32=-0.20, p = 0.84). For the grating task, expectations 
about stimulus orientation are not directly relevant to the task at hand (a spatial- 
frequency task) and therefore may not provide a behavioral benefit.
Visual cortex activity
To probe whether the effect of expectation depended on the task participants 
engaged in, we investigated the BOLD response in voxels in primary visual cortex 
that responded to the grating stimuli (see Methods). An interaction between 
expectation suppression and task would indicate that the effect of expectation is 
influenced by participants’ task set. This is indeed what we found: the effect of 
expectation depended on task (rmANOVA over all tasks, V1: F2,64=4.15, p = 0.020; 
V2: F2,64=3.44, p = 0.038). We were particularly interested to know whether the 
expectation effect differed between the two tasks in which the predictable stimulus 
was task-irrelevant, since these tasks differed only in the relative load they placed 
on perceptual and working memory resources, but were matched on the locus of 
spatial-attention and the task-irrelevance of the grating. Indeed, the expectation 
effect depended on how processing resources were constrained by task demands: 
there was greater expectation suppression during the perceptual task than during 
the working memory task (rmANOVA over fixation tasks, V1: F1,32=5.08, p = 0.0312; 
V2: F1,32=5.95, p = 0.020; Figure 3.2A). Expectation suppression was also greater 
during the perceptual task than during the grating task in V1 (rmANOVA over 
perceptual and grating tasks, V1: F1,32=7.02, p = 0.012; V2: rmANOVA, F1,32=2.03, 
p = 0.17). In fact, there was a significantly reduced neural response to predictable 
stimuli only during the perceptual task (V1: t32=2.90, p = 0.0068; V2: t32=2.54, 
p = 0.016), but not during the working memory task (V1: t32=-0.94, p = 0.35; V2: 
t32=-1.17, p = 0.25) or the grating task (t32=-1.52, p = 0.14; V2: t32=0.26, p = 0.79).
 V3 displayed the same pattern of results, but the interaction between task 
and expectation did not reach significance across any of the task combinations 
(rmANOVA over all tasks: F2,64=2.80, p = 0.068; rmANOVA over fixation tasks: V3: 
F1,32=3.90, p = 0.057; rmANOVA over perceptual and grating tasks, F1,32=2.40, 
p = 0.13).
 These results were obtained on the basis of the 150 most grating responsive 
voxels (as determined by an independent functional localizer, see Methods) per 
region of interest, but the effects were largely independent of the number of voxels 
included. Irrespective of exact voxel selection criteria, the expectation effect 
(activity for non-predictable – predictable blocks) was different from zero for the 
perceptual task, but overlapping with zero for the working memory and grating 
tasks (see Figure 3.2B).
48
CHAPTER 3
Figure 3.2.  Expectation suppression for unattended stimuli depends on task set. 
A) Amplitude of BOLD response (in arbitrary units; “a.u.”) within the 150 most grating-responsive 
voxels for predictable (green) and non-predictable (blue) stimuli, per visual area, per task. In 
each area, there was a reduced neural response to predictable stimuli within the perceptual 
task, but not during the working memory task or the grating task. Error bars reflect unbiased 
within-subjects corrected SEM (Cousineau, 2005; Morey, 2008). B) Expectation effects per 
number of included voxels, defined as the neural response to non-predictable minus the 
response to predictable gratings. Positive values indicate a lower response to predictable 
than non-predictable gratings (expectation suppression). Values close to zero indicate that 
expectation does not have an effect. Error bars reflect SEM. Grey region indicates the 
number of voxels depicted in A. Significance reported (if any) on the basis of t-tests for effect 
≠0. **p <0.01; *p <0.05; † 0.1> p >0.05
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 In addition to the interaction between task and expectation, task itself had a 
strong effect on the BOLD response of voxels in the primary visual cortex (main 
effect of task, rmANOVA over all tasks, V1: F2,64=21.51, p <.001; V2: F2,64=52.80, 
p <.001; V3: F2,64=60.47; p <.001; see Figure 3.2A). Neural activity within grating- 
responsive voxels in early visual cortex was more than twice as high during the 
grating task (i.e., when the grating stimulus was task-relevant) than during the 
fixation tasks (when the grating was a task-irrelevant background stimulus: t32=7.94, 
p < 0.0001), indicating that this task successfully manipulated spatial attention. 
Additionally, in V2, the comparison between fixation tasks revealed a trend of 
overall stronger suppression of the grating during the perceptual load task than 
Figure 3.3.  Interaction between task and expectation within bi-lateral cuneus  
and right insula.
Clusters within bilateral cuneus and right insular cortex show significantly stronger 
expectation suppression during the perceptual task than the working memory task (red/
yellow). Cuneus activity is anterior and lateral to early visual cortex (anatomical con-tours in 
magenta; saturation indicates degree of overlap between subjects). A) Results displayed on 
a 3D MNI brain. B) The same results displayed on axial slices showing the bilateral cuneus 
clusters and right insular cortex activation. Z-coordinates displayed under each slice in mm. 
Cluster extents determined by p < 0.001 uncorrected. Scale indicates t values and applies to 
both panels.
A B
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during the working memory load task (main effect of task, rmANOVA over fixation 
tasks: F1,32=3.23, p = 0.082). This trend was not present in V1 (F1,32=0.41, p = 0.53) or 
V3 (F1,32=1.36, p = 0.25). Because tasks were manipulated between runs, the 
absence of a robust task effect could therefore be caused by the increased variance 
in the task comparisons.
Whole-brain activity
Next, we probed whether other brain regions showed a similar interaction between 
the relative load on perceptual and working memory resources and expectation 
suppression. This interaction was present in bilateral cuneus (right: pFWE < .001; left: 
pFWE = 0.013) as well as right insular cortex (pFWE = 0.014, Figure 3.3). In other words, 
bilateral occipital cortex and right insula showed stronger expectation suppression 
in the perceptual than in the working memory task, similar to what we observed in 
V1-V3.
Discussion
Expected stimuli often evoke a reduced sensory response compared to unexpected 
stimuli. Here we investigated whether the expectation suppression of unattended 
and irrelevant stimuli in the periphery depends on the type of task people perform 
centrally. Specifically, we compared the neural response evoked by predictable and 
non-predictable stimuli during tasks that loaded either perceptual resources or 
working memory resources. We observed that expectation significantly suppressed 
peripheral stimuli only during the perceptual task, in which perceptual resources 
were heavily loaded and working memory resources were largely available. On the 
other hand, when working memory resources were heavily taxed and perceptual 
resources were largely available, expectation suppression was abolished.
 What could be the functional role of sensory suppression? Previous studies 
have found that sensory expectations facilitate perceptual inference, especially 
when input is complex and noisy or ambiguous (Bar, 2004). Anticipating sensory 
input naturally allocates processing resources in an efficient manner, with expected 
stimuli (that are thus low in informative value) receiving relatively fewer resources 
than surprising (and thus more informative) inputs (Rao and Ballard, 1999; Friston, 
2005; Summerfield et al., 2008; Den Ouden et al., 2009; Friston, 2009b; Summerfield 
and Egner, 2009; Alink et al., 2010; Todorovic et al., 2011; Kok et al., 2012a; Kok et al., 
2012b; Todorovic and De Lange, 2012). Predicting sensory input consequently 
minimizes both sensory uncertainty and processing resources consumed. For 
these reasons, it appears advantageous for the system to suppress predictable 
sensory inputs whenever possible.
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 During the task that placed a high load on working memory resources, there 
was no evidence of expectation suppression of the peripheral stimuli. Why would 
expectation suppression be abolished when working memory resources are 
strongly loaded by a concurrent task? The answer may lie in the fact that both 
expectation and working memory rely on a common process: bringing online 
stimulus templates in visual cortex. Recent studies show that the working memory 
maintenance of visual items leads to a cortical reinstatement of the maintained 
material in early sensory areas (Harrison and Tong, 2009; Serences et al., 2009; 
Riggall and Postle, 2012; Albers et al., 2013; Bosch et al., 2014), suggesting that the 
same neurons driven by bottom-up stimulus input become active during recall. 
Interestingly, stimulus expectation may employ this same process of cortical 
reinstatement (Albright, 2012; Summerfield and de Lange, 2014), with early sensory 
neurons representing a template of the expected stimulus, in the absence of 
bottom-up input (Kok et al., 2014). Once online, such stimulus templates can then 
be compared with incoming sensory information, facilitating perception and 
behaviour when there is a match (Lee and Mumford, 2003; Bar, 2004; Friston, 2005; 
Friston, 2009b; Kok et al., 2012a). We therefore speculate that expectation 
suppression may be abolished during the working memory task because this task 
places a high demand on the same resources needed for cortical reinstatement of 
expectation templates of the peripheral, irrelevant stimuli. Consequently, this 
inability to bring online templates of expected stimuli abolishes expectation 
suppression. Given that the task-relevant stimuli and the gratings were processed 
in non-overlapping regions of V1, the conflict may not be at the level of sensory 
cortex, but rather at the level of the frontal and parietal regions that are involved 
both in working memory (Fuster, 1973; Curtis and D’Esposito, 2003) and the 
generation of sensory predictions (Summerfield et al., 2006; Rahnev et al., 2011). 
The prefrontal cortex is known to be involved in top-down driven distractor 
suppression (Gazzaley and Nobre, 2012; Marini, 2014), and taxing this region with a 
working memory task may thereby hinder effective top-down suppression. 
Supporting this link between working memory and top-down suppression 
mechanisms, it has been found that during a challenging cognitive control task, 
individuals with high working memory capacity display relatively more distractor 
suppression than individuals with low working memory capacity (Gulbinaite et al., 
2014).
 Alternatively, the lack of expectation suppression during the working memory 
task may not solely be due to the high load on working memory resources, but 
caused by the relative absence of load on perceptual resources posed by this task. 
In other words, expectation suppression may take place only when predictable 
stimuli compete for task-relevant perceptual resources, as is the case in our 
perceptual load condition. During the (perceptually simple) working memory task, 
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perceptual resources are untaxed; therefore there is no need to suppress the 
irrelevant peripheral grating stimuli. In line with this, there was a trend towards an 
overall reduced sensory response to the peripheral grating when perceptual 
resources were centrally loaded (i.e., the grating evoked the least neural activity 
while participants performed the perceptual task compared to the other two 
tasks). This explanation could also explain the lack of expectation suppression 
during the grating task, since in this case the predictable stimuli are task-relevant, 
and so do not induce perceptual competition. However, previous research has 
shown that expectation suppression is also present in the absence of perceptual 
competition (Summerfield et al., 2008; Alink et al., 2010; Kok et al., 2012a). We 
cannot distinguish between the working memory and the perceptual competition 
explanations of our results on the basis of the current study.
 This study manipulated cognitive load type by including different types of tasks 
and matching them for overall difficulty using an adaptive staircase procedure. 
Future studies may examine the role of different types of cognitive load more fully 
by manipulating the level of load within tasks (i.e., high vs. low load for each task). 
This may allow for more specific conclusions to be drawn about the factors relevant 
to expectation suppression, and distinguish between the two explanations of our 
results presented above.
 Our results suggest that expectation suppression does not require attention 
to the predictable stimuli, but instead depends on the type of available cognitive 
resources. However, one might argue that the working memory task was more 
demanding than the perceptual task, and therefore left less attention for the 
gratings. In other words, the gratings might have been somewhat attended during 
the perceptual task, but not during the working memory task, culminating in 
expectation suppression for the former task but not the latter. In contrast to this 
notion however, we find an overall relatively stronger response to the irrelevant 
gratings during the working memory task, opposite to what would be expected 
with increased attentional load at the fovea. Additionally, accuracy was matched 
between tasks, suggesting that the complexity of the tasks were not markedly 
different. Both of these points argue against the possibility of reduced spatial 
attention for the grating during the working memory task.
 Whole brain analyses revealed that bilateral cuneus and right insula showed 
the same interaction pattern between expectation and task that was present in 
early visual cortex. These areas have been previously reported to show sensitivity 
to statistical regularities in the environment (Turk-Browne et al., 2009).
 We also included a task where participants responded to the grating stimuli, 
causing the predictable stimuli to become attended. Here we did not find an effect 
of expectation on the neural response. This result is perhaps unexpected, given 
that several previous studies show expectation suppression also for attended 
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stimuli (Summerfield et al., 2008; Todorovic et al., 2011; Kok et al., 2012a). However, 
the interaction between attention and expectation is complex and multifaceted 
(Summerfield and Egner, 2009; Summerfield and de Lange, 2014). Recent studies 
suggest that attention interacts with expectation and may even reverse its effect 
(Bendixen et al., 2012; Kok et al., 2012b), such that expectation enhances the 
response when stimuli are attended (Doherty et al., 2005; Chaumon et al., 2008). 
Indeed, many studies on attention employ cues that concurrently signal what is 
likely and what is relevant (Posner and Petersen, 1990), thereby conflating 
expectation and attention. These studies generally observe increased activity for 
expected/attended sensory events (Maunsell and Treue, 2006). In light of this, we 
speculate that the absence of an expectation effect for attended stimuli in the 
current study could potentially be explained by an interaction between the 
opposing effects of attention and expectation. Additionally, previous research has 
generally focused on the contrast between confirmed and violated expectations 
(i.e., expected vs. unexpected), whereas here we contrasted situations with and 
without expectation cues (i.e., expected vs. non-expected). It is possible that the 
expectation suppression is particularly visible when contrasted against stimuli for 
which the expectation is violated, rather than for stimuli for which no strong 
expectation is present. 
 To summarize, our results provide insight into the resource dependency of 
expectation suppression. We show that expectation suppresses unattended, 
predictable stimuli when perceptual resources are loaded, but that this suppression 
is absent when working memory resources are loaded. This suggests that 
differences in the type of cognitive load might explain the conflict in the literature 
regarding the presence or absence of expectation suppression. Furthermore, our 
findings indicate that predictable stimuli do not need to be attended in order to be 
suppressed by expectation, pointing to resource availability as a crucial factor 
instead.

Graded expectations:  
How does the brain weigh prior 
expectation with task-relevant  
sensory input?
4
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Introduction
Imagine that you are out for a run in your neighbourhood in the evening. You notice 
a dark shape on the path ahead. A person bent over to pick something up, you 
think. But as you draw nearer, you realize it is just a pair of garbage bags, and what 
you saw as a head and a bent knee are just some bulges in the bags, catching the 
streetlight. We have all experienced this type of mistaken perception: when lighting 
is poor, or visibility is otherwise impaired (due to rain, mist, or poor eyesight), 
chance configurations of visual input are often interpreted as objects. This is because 
– far from being a passive process which gives rise to a veridical representation of 
external stimuli – perception is an inferential process wherein previous experience 
is used to make sense of current sensory input (Helmholtz, 1867; Summerfield and 
de Lange, 2014). The sensory inputs caused by the configuration of the garbage 
bags fit with the hypothesis of a crouching person, thus this percept reflected the 
brain’s ‘best guess’ of the world at that moment.
 We are more prone to mistaken perceptual inference when sensory input is 
noisy or ambiguous – we probably wouldn’t have mistaken the garbage bags for a 
person in broad daylight. This is in line with the idea that perception is more 
influenced by prior knowledge when sensory input is noisy or ambiguous. Indeed, 
many theories of perception hold that sensory input should be weighted according 
to its reliability (Mumford, 1992; Rao and Ballard, 1997; Knill and Pouget, 2004; 
Friston, 2009a), with the consequence that priors should be up-weighted when 
sensory input is less reliable.
 Empirical evidence supports this view. For example, low speeds are more 
frequent in the natural environment, and accordingly human perception is 
governed by a low speed prior (Weiss et al., 2002). Interestingly, this prior has more 
influence on perception when the sensory input has low contrast as compared to 
high contrast (Thompson, 1982; Stone and Thompson, 1992; Stocker and Simoncelli, 
2006) – in other words, there was an increased effect of the prior when the stimulus 
strength was weak. Similarly, a study that manipulated stimulus strength through 
presentation duration found that a bias in perceived orientation was stronger 
when stimuli were weak (i.e., short duration) than when they were strong (i.e., long 
duration; (Wei and Stocker, 2015). Furthermore, a recent study showed that the 
expectation that a specific stimulus would be presented increased the sensitivity 
to weak stimulus-like sensory signals more so than to strong signals (Wyart et al., 
2012).
 In addition to this behavioral evidence, there is also some neural data that 
support an increased role for prior expectation when sensory input is weak. The 
brain is organized hierarchically, with sensory information fed forwards, up the 
hierarchy, and top-down signals such as prior knowledge or expectations sent 
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backwards, down the hierarchy. Feedback from higher-order areas can modulate 
the neural response in lower-order areas, amplifying or suppressing it. Hupé et al. 
(1998) demonstrated that the neural activity in a lower-order area was most 
strongly influenced by feedback signals from a higher-order area when the sensory 
input was weak. This is in line with an increased role of prior knowledge (sent via 
feedback signals) when sensory input is weak.
 One well known influence of prior knowledge on the neural response is 
expectation suppression: a stimulus evokes a reduced response when it is expected 
compared to when it is unexpected (Summerfield et al., 2008; Den Ouden et al., 
2009; Alink et al., 2010; Todorovic et al., 2011). For example, when the orientation of 
a visual grating stimulus is validly cued by a preceding auditory tone, the response 
in voxels that code for the stimulus in primary visual cortex is reduced relative to 
when that stimulus is invalidly cued (Kok et al., 2012a). Interestingly, this reduction 
of the neural activity is accompanied by an improved stimulus representation, 
quantified as the ability of a classifier to detect orientation information in the 
neural activity (Kok et al., 2012a). Neuroimaging paradigms to investigate the effects 
of expectation typically use stimuli that evoke a strong neural response. Visual 
stimuli, for example, are typically high contrast and otherwise easy to perceive 
(large, ample duration, etc.) – in the case of Kok and colleagues (2012a), grating 
stimuli were presented at 80% contrast for 500 ms.
 Given that expectation suppression reflects a modulation of the sensory 
response based on prior knowledge, and the evidence that priors have a larger 
influence on perception when sensory input is weak, we formulated two hypotheses. 
First: the amount of expectation suppression should depend on the quality of 
the sensory input, and be (relatively) stronger when sensory input is weak. Second: 
the amount of sharpening in the sensory representation should likewise be relatively 
increased when sensory input is weak.
 To test these hypotheses, we modified the paradigm of Kok et al. (2012a). 
Following Stocker & Simoncelli (2006), we manipulated the strength of the sensory 
input through stimulus contrast: 80% contrast for strong sensory input, and 10% 
contrast for weak sensory input.
Materials and Methods
Participants
Twenty-seven healthy right-handed individuals (19 females, age 23.4 ± 3.1, mean ± 
standard deviation (SD)) with normal or corrected-to-normal vision gave written 
informed consent to participate in this study. The study consisted of one 
behavioural session and two fMRI sessions, the first of which is described here. 
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The second session is described in Chapter 5. Experimental procedures were 
approved by the local ethics committee (Commissie Mensgebonden Onderzoek 
region Arnhem-Nijmegen, the Netherlands). Two participants were excluded due 
to excessive head movement (>2 mm in several task sessions), and one participant 
was excluded due to poor task performance (>2 SD below average task performance; 
60% correct). Therefore, 24 participants were included in the analyses.
Stimuli
A small central fixation point was displayed at full contrast on a mean luminance 
gray background throughout the experiment. Grating stimuli were annuli (outer 
diameter: 15° of visual angle; inner diameter: 1.5°) containing luminance-defined 
sinusoids that remained on screen for 500 ms. On each trial, gratings were 
presented at one of two main orientations (45° or 135°) and one of two contrast 
values (10% (Figure 4.1C) or 80% (Figure 4.1B)), and a random spatial phase was 
selected from 10 values evenly spaced between 0 and 2π. Within each contrast 
level, 50% of trials were rotated by a small amount from the diagonals (25% 
clockwise (CW) and 25% counter clockwise (CCW); mean rotation: 7.2°), and 50% of 
trials were presented along the diagonal. The amount of rotation was determined 
per condition in a preceding behavioural session (see Behavioural Session below), 
and was updated online using adaptive staircases during the fMRI session (one for 
each condition; 1up-1down staircase with step-size ratio 0.2845, intended to 
achieve approximately 78% accuracy (Garcia-Perez, 1998)). A subtle flicker of the 
fixation dot, which was included for purposes of the second fMRI session (described 
in Chapter 5) occurred 0-3 times per trial for a total of 64 times a block. Auditory 
stimuli consisted of two pure tones (450 and 1000 Hz) with 200 ms duration. Stimuli 
were generated using MATLAB (MathWorks, Natick, MA, US) in conjunction with 
Psychophysics Toolbox (Brainard, 1997). In the fMRI session, stimuli were displayed 
on a rear projection screen using a luminance-calibrated EIKI projector (60 Hz 
refresh rate, 1024 × 768 resolution) which participants viewed through a mirror. In 
the behavioural session, stimuli were displayed on a Samsung SynchMaster 940BF 
monitor (60 Hz refresh rate, 1024 × 768 resolution).
Experimental Design
Stimuli were presented in an event-related design, with 4.6-6.6 s between trials. 
Each trial consisted of an auditory tone and a grating stimulus. The auditory tones 
preceded the gratings by 750 ms, and predicted the orientation of the grating that 
would appear on that trial (45° or 135°) with 75% validity (Figure 4.1A). The timing 
and duration of the tone and grating stimuli is based on Kok et al. (2012a). 
Participants’ task was to report whether the grating was oriented along the diagonal 
(i.e., 45° and 135°) or was slightly rotated in either direction from the diagonal 
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(Figure 4.1B-C). Participants had 1.5 s from grating onset to respond using an 
MR-compatible button box (button 1=‘on diagonal’; button 2=‘off diagonal’). To 
encourage participants to respond to every trial, the fixation dot would turn red for 
100 ms following a missed response. Feedback was given between blocks (mean 
accuracy, mean RT, and the number of missed trials for that block). Each block 
contained 64 trials, and participants completed 8 blocks (2 blocks per scanner run) 
for a total of 512 trials. A screen displaying the predictive relationship between 
the tones and gratings was displayed for 2 s at the beginning of each scanner run. 
The contingencies between tone and orientation were counterbalanced across 
participants.
 Two additional scans were carried out after the main experiment: one to 
identify voxels that were maximally responsive to the grating stimulus, and one to 
enable the segmentation of early visual cortex into retinotopic areas. During the 
localizer, full contrast grating stimuli with the same size and position as the main 
experiment were flickered at 2 Hz for 14.4 s. Gratings were presented at eight 
orientations (22.5°, 45.0°, 67.5°, 90.0°, 112.5°, 135.0°, and 157.5°), with each 
Figure 4.1. Experimental paradigm.
A) Auditory cues predicted grating orientation (~45° or ~135°) with 75% validity. B-C) On 
every trial, a grating stimulus was presented 550 ms after the auditory cue. Grating stimuli 
were either perfectly aligned to a diagonal or rotated slightly clockwise or counterclockwise 
from the diagonal. Participants’ task was to judge, based on an internal reference of the 
diagonals, whether the grating was rotated or aligned with respect to the diagonal. The red 
dashed lines were not presented to participants. B) A high contrast trial. Here the overall 
orientation of the grating is expected, and the grating is slightly off-diagonal. C) A low contrast 
trial. Here the grating is unexpected, and on the diagonal. High and low contrast trials were 
randomly intermixed within blocks.
A B
C
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orientation displayed eight times in a pseudo-random order, interspersed with 
eight fixation blocks. Thus, each cycle of eight grating blocks and one fixation block 
lasted 129.6s, and this was repeated 8 times, with a break halfway through. To 
ensure fixation, participants’ task was to detect two letters (‘X’, ‘Z’) in a stream of 
letters within a 0.8° fixation bull’s-eye. During the retinotopy scan, a flashing black-
and-white checkerboard pattern (3 Hz) in a 90° wedge rotated on a black 
background in 30° steps (1 position per TR). Participants’ task was to detect 
unpredictable changes in the colour of the central fixation point (white to black), 
which occurred four to eight times per 36 s block. Nine cycles of CW and CCW 
rotation were presented. During both additional scans, participants responded to 
target events with a button press.
Behavioural Session
Within a time frame of approximately one week prior to the fMRI session, 
participants took part in a behavioral session outside the scanner. Participants 
were gradually introduced to the task, and trained on the contingencies between 
the tones and grating orientations. After this, performance was titrated to 75% 
using a Quest staircase procedure (Watson and Pelli, 1983), which adjusted the 
rotation angle of off-diagonal trials. Because stimuli with high contrast and/or an 
expected orientation might increase sensitivity to small rotation deviations, and 
therefore induce performance differences between the conditions, we used 
separate staircases for each contrast and expectation value (i.e., four staircases 
presented in an interleaved fashion). To limit the differences between bottom-up 
input between the conditions, the maximal rotation angle of off-diagonal trials 
could not exceed 12° in either (CW or CCW) direction. During this procedure, 
participants completed blocks of 64 trials until rotation offsets were stable 
(approximately 320 trials). Once this was completed, participants were introduced 
and staircased on a second task (described in Chapter 5). The behavioural session 
lasted between 45-90 minutes.
fMRI Acquisition
Functional images were acquired on a 3T Trio MRI system (Siemens, Erlangen, 
Germany) using a 32-channel head coil, with a multi-band EPI sequence (TR 1.8 s, 
84 transversal slices, 2 x 2 x 2 mm in-plane resolution, TE 28 ms, field of view 210 
mm x 210 mm, flip angle 73°, multi-band acceleration factor of 3, GRAPPA 
acceleration factor of 2). A high resolution anatomical image was collected using a 
T1-weighted MP-RAGE sequence (TR 2.3 s, TE 3.03 ms, 1 x 1 x 1 mm in-plane 
resolution, GRAPPA acceleration factor of 2).
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fMRI Data Preprocessing
Data were pre-processed using SPM8 (http://www.fil.ion.ucl.ac.uk/spm; Wellcome 
Trust Centre for Neuroimaging, London, UK). The first four volumes of each task 
run were discarded to allow for time to achieve initial equilibrium. Functional 
images were spatially realigned to the mean image, and the resulting movement 
parameters, their first order derivatives and the square of these derivatives were 
included as nuisance regressors in all general linear models (GLMs). The structural 
image was coregistered to the mean functional image.
fMRI Data Analysis
Data were modelled using an event-related approach and analyzed within the 
framework of a General Linear Model (GLM). Regressors for each task condition 
were constructed by convolving delta functions at stimulus onsets with SPM8’s 
canonical hemodynamic response function and its temporal and dispersion 
derivatives (Friston et al., 1998). Temporal and dispersion derivatives were included 
to capture possible deviations from the canonical HRF in terms of latency and 
duration of the BOLD response. In addition to task regressors (expected-high 
contrast; unexpected-high contrast; expected-low contrast; unexpected-low 
contrast), the model included nuisance regressors for the screens displaying 
tone-grating contingencies, feedback, and breaks, as well as the motion parameters 
as described above (see fMRI Data Preprocessing). Regressors were specified per 
run, and all task runs (from both fMRI sessions) were included in one GLM. A 128 s 
high-pass filter removed low-frequency signal drifts.
 Data from the grating localizer were modelled in a separate design matrix 
using a blocked-design approach, with regressors for stimulation, fixation, and the 
motion parameters (with derivatives as discussed above). Due to the slower 
stimulus frequency during the localizer (each cycle of grating and fixation blocks 
took 129.6 s), we employed a high-pass filter of 256 s for the localizer scan to 
remove low-frequency signal components. In a separate analysis, Freesurfer 
(surfer.nmr.mgh.harvard.edu/) was used to inflate the cortical surface of each 
participant’s T1-weighted structural image and to automatically identify the 
anatomical boundaries of V1. This was used as the region of interest (ROI) for our 
subsequent analyses.
 As a measure of BOLD amplitude, the resulting canonical HRF beta-weights for 
the conditions of interest were averaged across runs of the grating task. To perform 
our main analysis, we selected 200 voxels that were most responsive to the grating 
stimulus during the localizer within the V1 ROI. For each condition, we averaged the 
beta weights of these voxels. To test whether the effect of expectation was 
influenced by the contrast of the grating stimulus, we performed a repeated 
measures ANOVA (rmANOVA) with factors expectation (expected; unexpected) 
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and contrast (high; low). Significant interactions were followed up with post-hoc 
t-tests on the expectation effect at each level of stimulus contrast. Expectation 
effects were calculated by subtracting the beta for expected gratings from the beta 
for unexpected gratings, such that positive values indicate a lower response to 
expected than unexpected gratings (expectation suppression). We statistically 
evaluated the robustness of the effect using 200 voxels. To verify whether our 
results were stable across different voxel selection criteria, we calculated the 
expectation effect (per contrast level) and the corresponding standard error of the 
mean (SEM) over a range of included voxels (50 to 200 voxels, in steps of 25 voxels).
 It is possible that expectation may influence the latency and/or the duration 
of the neural response, and therefore the timing of the BOLD response. Therefore, 
to visualise the time course of the fitted BOLD response for each condition, 
we multiplied each HRF basis function (i.e., canonical, temporal, dispersion) by 
its fitted beta weight, and summed the three resulting timecourses.
Forward Modelling
To perform the forward modelling analysis, the above task regressors were defined 
separately for each orientation. Additionally, we split expected trials over three 
regressors so that the same number of trials would be used during the estimation 
of the expected and unexpected conditions. Again, information, feedback, and 
break screens, as well as the motion parameters as described above (see fMRI Data 
Preprocessing), were included in the model as nuisance regressors, and regressors 
were specified per run, with all task runs included in a single GLM. A separate GLM 
was specified for the grating localizer in which each trial was modeled by a separate 
regressor, with the motion parameters included as nuisance regressors. All GLMs 
for the multivariate analyses were performed in Matlab on the preprocessed data 
(high-pass filtered as per the amplitude analysis). To compensate for overall 
amplitude differences between runs, parameter estimates were normalized to 
z-scores for the localizer run and the experimental runs separately.
 To probe stimulus representations in the visual cortex, we used a forward 
modelling approach to reconstruct the orientation angle from the BOLD signal 
(Brouwer and Heeger, 2009, 2011). This model assumes that each voxel is comprised 
of a large number of orientation-selective neurons with different orientation 
preferences, and that these preferences are fixed across sensory stimulation. We 
characterized the orientation selectivity of each voxel as a weighted sum of six 
hypothetical channels, each with an idealized direction tuning curve (or basis 
function). Model parameters are specified according to Brouwer & Heeger (2011). 
Each basis function was a half-wave sinusoid raised to the fifth power. Raising to 
the fifth power made the tuning curves narrower and thereby comparable to 
physiological findings. The six basis functions were evenly spaced within the 180° 
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orientation space, such that one channel responded maximally to the 135° stimulus 
and another channel responded maximally to the 45° stimulus, with two channels 
separating them on either side. The shape of the resulting channels approximate 
observed tuning curves of neurons in early visual cortex (Heeger, 1992).
 In the first stage of the analysis, we used parameter estimates obtained from 
the localizer run to estimate the weights on the six hypothetical channels separately 
for each voxel, using linear regression. The details of this analysis have been reported 
previously (Brouwer and Heeger, 2011; Kok et al., 2013). Briefly, we estimated a 
weight matrix which related the matrix of estimated response amplitudes for the 
eight orientations presented during the localizer to the matrix of hypothetical 
channel outputs. Weights therefore reflected the relative contribution of the six 
hypothetical channels in the forward model to the observed response amplitude 
of each voxel. Using these weights, the second stage of analysis reconstructed the 
channel outputs associated with the pattern of activity across voxels evoked by the 
stimuli in the main experiment, again using linear regression. This step transformed 
each vector of n voxel responses (parameter estimates) to each trial into a vector 
of six channel responses. We reconstructed the population response separately 
for each condition (expected-high contrast; unexpected-high contrast; expected- low 
contrast; unexpected-low contrast) within the 200 voxels that were most responsive 
to the grating stimulus during the localizer within the V1 ROI (the same voxels as 
used in the amplitude analysis). Note that each expected condition was modelled 
by three regressors, each containing 1/3 of the expected trials – the forward model 
was run on each of these subsets and the resulting channel responses were 
averaged. Then, we averaged the channel responses to each condition over runs of 
the same task. Channel responses were zero-centred such that presented 
orientations (i.e., 135° and 45°) were set to 0°, and neighbouring channels were 
re-labelled relative to the presented channel (in other words, the 0° to 180° space 
became a -90° to +90° space).
 To quantify the amount of orientation information in the channel responses, 
for each participant we subtracted the response of the channel orthogonal to the 
presented orientation from the response of the channel at the presented 
orientation (i.e., for trials with 135° gratings, the response of the 45° channel was 
subtracted from the 135° channel, and vice versa for trials with 45° gratings) 
separately for each condition. To test whether our conditions influenced the 
amount of orientation signal present in the population response, we performed an 
rmANOVA with factors expectation (expected; unexpected) and contrast (high; 
low). 
 To determine whether non-significant t-values reflected support for the null 
hypotheses, we used the online Bayes Factor Calculator (Rouder et al., 2009) to 
convert t-values to Scaled Jeffrey-Zellner-Siow ( JZS) Bayes Factors. These factors 
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are directly interpretable: they provide the odds ratio in favour of one hypothesis 
over the other. For each test we used a JZS Prior (Cauchy distribution on effect size), 
without scaling the prior on the effect size (r = 1; default value) (Rouder et al., 2009). 
Smaller values of r can be used when effect sizes are expected to be small, however 
the effect size of the expectation effect in Kok et al. (2012a) is large (0.83), obviating 
the need for scaling. 
Results
Behaviour
Participants were presented with high and low contrast gratings at orientations 
that were validly cued by a preceding auditory tone on 75% of trials. The task was 
to indicate whether grating were oriented precisely along one of the two diagonals, 
or slightly rotated from the diagonals: therefore gratings were relevant to the task. 
Using the two factors of contrast and expectation, we hoped to elucidate whether 
prior expectation are weighed differently depending on the strength of the sensory 
input.
 On average, participants were 79% correct (± 7%) and responded after 780 ms 
(± 88 ms), indicating that participants followed task instructions and were able to 
perform the task. Because we implemented a staircasing procedure to match task 
performance on the different conditions, there should be no benefit of high 
Figure 4.2.  Behavioural results.
A) Faster reaction times to high contrast trials; however no significant benefit of expectation. 
B)  The staircases successfully calibrated the stimuli such that there were no accuracy 
differences between the conditions. ***p <0.0001.
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contrast or valid expectation on accuracy. Indeed, accuracy was not influenced by 
either factor (contrast: F1,23=0.27, p = 0.61; expectation: F1,23=1.55, p = 0.23), nor did 
they interact (F1,23=0.01, p = 0.94; Figure 4.2B). The average rotation offset for 
off-diagonal trials was 7.2° (± 2.6°) CW or CCW. Though one might expect high 
contrast trials to have a smaller rotation offset, conditions did not differ in the 
average amount of rotation (mean high contrast: 7.3°; mean low contrast: 7.1°, 
(t23=1.26, p = 0.22)).
 As expected, responses were faster on high contrast trials (mean low contrast: 
794 ms, mean high contrast: 767 ms; F1,23=29.70, p = 1.54e-5; Figure 4.2A). There 
was no effect of expectation on response time (F1,23=0.35, p = 0.56). There was also 
no interaction between contrast and expectation (F1,23=1.08, p = 0.31) on response 
time.
V1 amplitude results
To investigate whether expectation and contrast influenced how stimuli were 
processed by primary visual cortex, we selected voxels with the largest response to 
the grating in an independent localizer scan.
 The amplitude of the stimulus-evoked BOLD response in V1 was strongly 
driven by grating contrast (F1,23=59.27, p = 8.23e-8; Figure 4.3A). There was an 
interaction between contrast and expectation (F1,23=6.43, p = 0.0185), such that the 
response to expected gratings was suppressed only on low contrast trials (low 
contrast: t23=3.27, p = 0.00339, high contrast: t23=-1.08, p = 0.29). Irrespective of 
exact voxel selection criteria, the expectation effect (activity for unexpected minus 
expected gratings) was different from zero for low contrast gratings, but overlapping 
with zero for high contrast gratings (see Figure 4.3B). To further investigate the null 
effect of expectation on high contrast gratings, we converted the t-value to a JZS 
Bayes factor (Rouder et al., 2009). The resulting value of 3.7 suggests some 
moderate support for the null hypothesis (i.e., the null hypothesis is approximately 
3.7 times as likely as the alternative hypothesis), as opposed to a lack of power to 
adjudicate between the null and alternative hypotheses. For illustration purposes, 
we visualised the timecourse of the fitted BOLD response to the different conditions 
(Figure 4.3C). The timecourses are highly similar for expected and unexpected 
stimuli: expectation does not change the onset or peak latency of the BOLD 
response.
V1 stimulus representation results
Next, in the same set of voxels, we investigated how the pattern of neural activity 
representing the orientation of the stimulus was influenced by contrast and 
expectation. We quantified the amount of orientation information by subtracting 
the response of the orientation channel tuned to the orthogonal orientation from 
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the channel tuned to the presented orientation. High contrast increased the 
amount of orientation information (F1,23=63.10, p =4.84e-8; Figure 4.4) in the 
population response. There was no effect of expectation (F1,23=0.22, p = 0.64) and 
Figure 4.3.  Stimulus activity in V1.
A) Amplitude of BOLD response (in arbitrary units; “a.u.”) within the 200 most grating- 
responsive voxels for expected (green) and unexpected (red) stimuli for each contrast level. 
High contrast gratings drive a larger BOLD response than low contrast gratings. Expectation 
interacts with contrast: low contrast stimuli are suppressed when they are expected 
compared to unexpected, however, there is no modulation of the response to high contrast 
gratings by expectation. Error bars reflect unbiased within-subjects corrected SEM (Cousineau, 
2005; Morey, 2008). B) Expectation effects per number of included voxels, defined as the 
neural response to unexpected minus the response to expected gratings. Positive values 
indicate a lower response to expected than unexpected gratings (expectation suppression). 
Values close to zero indicate that expectation does not have an effect. Error bars reflect SEM. 
C) Timecourses of the fitted BOLD response. Significance reported (if any) on the basis of 
t-tests for effect ≠0. **p <0.01; *p <0.05.
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these factors did not interact (F1,23=0.36, p = 0.55). The JZS Bayes factor for the 
effect of expectation is 5.7, which can be interpreted as some support for the null 
hypothesis (the odds are about 5.7 to 1 in favour of the alternative hypothesis). 
Discussion
In this experiment we investigated the effect of stimulus contrast on effects of 
expectation. In line with our first hypothesis, we found that the effect of the prior 
on the amplitude of the response was modulated by the quality of the sensory 
input: expectation suppression was stronger for low contrast stimuli than high 
contrast stimuli.
 This result is in line with previous studies that have reported both a stronger 
influence of prior knowledge on perception (Thompson, 1982; Stone and 
Thompson, 1992; Stocker and Simoncelli, 2006; Wyart et al., 2012) and a larger 
modulation of sensory processing via feedback signals (Hupé et al., 1998) when 
sensory input is weak. These results suggest that there is a push-pull relationship 
between the weight given to bottom-up and top-down sources of information, with 
sensory input weighted according to its strength or quality. Indeed, when 
integrating sensory input from multiple sources, both humans (Ernst and Banks, 
2002) and monkeys (Fetsch et al., 2012) proficiently weigh each source of information 
Figure 4.4.  Orientation information in V1.
The channel response (in arbitrary units; “a.u.”) reconstructed from the 200 most grating-re-
sponsive voxels for expected (green) and unexpected (red) stimuli for high (solid lines) and 
low (dotted lines) contrast. Channels are ordered such that 0° maps onto the nearest 
diagonal of the stimulus orientation presented on that trial (i.e., 45° becomes 0° for ~45° 
trials), with 90° representing the orthogonal orientation. Error bars reflect unbiased with-
in-subjects corrected SEM (Cousineau, 2005; Morey, 2008).
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according to its reliability. For instance, sensory information acquired through 
vision is more precise than sensory information acquired through touch, and as 
such vision tends to dominate the integrated percept – however, when visual input 
is noisy and less reliable, haptic cues are given more weight (Ernst and Banks, 
2002).
 The interaction between expectation and contrast was driven by the presence 
of a suppression effect only for low contrast stimuli: counter to our expectations, 
there was no difference in the response to expected and unexpected stimuli at 
high contrast. This null effect does not appear to be driven by a lack of power to 
adjudicate between the null and alternative hypotheses; however nor is the 
support for the null hypothesis strong. Given that our task was based on the 
paradigm used in Kok et al., (2012a), which reported robust expectation suppression 
at the identical contrast value, what might account for the fact that we find no 
modulation of the BOLD response by expectation in our design?
 One possibility is the subtle differences to the task participants performed in 
this study: a ‘target/non-target’ task based on rotation from an internal template of 
the diagonals, compared to an orientation discrimination task between two 
consecutively presented gratings. Indeed, we have previously demonstrated that 
subtle differences in task set have profound effects on expectation suppression 
(St. John-Saaltink et al., 2015). However, an explanation purely based on task 
differences seems unlikely, given that we found a robust effect of expectation at 
low contrast using the same paradigm. In other words, the task used here does not 
preclude expectation suppression per se (although it may have attenuated it, 
thereby rendering it detectable only when the stimulus was weak). A second 
possibility is that the interleaved presentation of gratings at high and low contrast 
altered the context of stimulus processing. In the present study, the mean contrast 
over the experiment was 45%: perhaps this context emphasized the reliability of 
the high contrast gratings (which were substantially above the mean contrast), 
resulting in less use of prior knowledge. Put differently, what is considered a ‘strong’ 
or ‘weak’ sensory signal may depend on the expected strength of the sensory 
signal in the given context (Friston, 2009a). Alternatively, the fact that the contrast 
of the gratings changed randomly from trial to trial may have made the gratings 
appearance less predictable, lessening the effect of the predictive cues. Future 
studies could test these hypotheses by comparing the effects of a contrast 
manipulation in trial-by-trial (as here) and block-wise designs.
 Our second hypothesis was in regards to the orientation information present 
in the neural response to the grating stimuli. Through training a forward model on 
the neural responses to an independent localizer, we were able to reconstruct the 
orientation signal present in the neural response to each stimulus during the task. 
Sensibly, this signal peaked at the orientation of the presented stimulus, and it was 
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stronger for high contrast gratings than for low contrast gratings. However, we did 
not find evidence for the sharpening account of expectation at either contrast: 
expectation did not influence the amount of orientation information present in the 
neural response. This is at odds with previous evidence for ‘sharpened’ neural rep-
resentations of expected stimuli (Kok et al., 2012a). Future research is therefore 
necessary to investigate whether differences in task underlie whether or not 
expected stimuli benefit from a sharpened neural representation.
 In conclusion, sensory expectations facilitate perceptual inference, especially 
when input is noisy or ambiguous (Bar, 2004). This study demonstrates that, in a 
context where the strength of the sensory signal varies, expectations modulate 
the response specifically when the signal strength is low. This is in line with a 
probabilistic view of perceptual inference, whereby perception depends more 
strongly on previous experience with the world when sensory input is ambiguous 
or incomplete.
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Many theories of perceptual inference posit that sensory input should be weighted 
according to its reliability (Mumford, 1992; Rao and Ballard, 1997; Knill and Pouget, 
2004; Friston, 2009a), with the consequence that prior knowledge of the sensory 
statistics should be given more weight when sensory input is less reliable. In line 
with this, studies have found that prior knowledge has an increased effect on 
perception when signal strength is low compared to high (Thompson, 1982; Stone 
and Thompson, 1992; Stocker and Simoncelli, 2006; Wyart et al., 2012). In the previous 
chapter, we demonstrated that this also held for the effect of prior knowledge on 
the neural response to sensory input: valid expectations reduced the neural 
response when the stimulus signal was weak, but not when it was strong. However, 
in all of the aforementioned studies have a feature in common: the stimuli were 
attended by participants, because they were relevant to the task participants were 
performing. Therefore, it is unknown whether this reduction in neural activity to 
expected stimuli is the result of an automatic computation of the visual system, or 
instead critically depends on the requirements of the observer.
 Previous research on this topic has been inconclusive. There is substantial 
evidence that when stimuli are attended, a valid expectation about which stimulus 
to expect suppresses the neural response (Summerfield et al., 2008; Todorovic 
et al., 2011). This is true even when participants’ task is orthogonal to the predictive 
information, or when cues provide information about a different dimension of the 
stimulus than is relevant to their task (Kok et al., 2012a) – however, for a counter- 
example, see St. John-Saaltink et al. (2015). Evidence is more divided on the question 
of whether expectation can influence stimulus processing in the absence of (spatial) 
attention. When stimuli are task-irrelevant but spatial attention is not actively 
diverted from them, studies report a reduced neural response to predictable 
stimuli (Den Ouden et al., 2009; Alink et al., 2010). On the other hand, when 
attention is actively diverted from the stimuli, there is evidence that the type of task 
that is used to divert spatial attention can have important consequences. For instance, 
expectation suppression of a task-irrelevant stimulus has been reported when the 
distracting task loaded perceptual resources (St. John-Saaltink et al., 2015), but not 
when it loaded working memory resources (Larsson and Smith, 2012; St. John- 
Saaltink et al., 2015). 
 In the current study we examined whether prior expectation is weighed as a 
function of the strength of the sensory evidence independently of task demands, 
or instead depends on attentional set. To this end, we invited the participants 
who completed the fMRI session discussed in Chapter 4 for a second fMRI session. 
We presented grating stimuli with orientations that were either expected or 
unexpected, and manipulated the strength of the sensory input through stimulus 
contrast (Chapter 4; Stocker and Simoncelli, 2006). Crucially, during this session we 
rendered the peripheral grating stimuli task-irrelevant by having participants 
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perform a perceptual task at fixation. This allowed us to compare the response 
characteristics of expectation when stimuli are attended and task-relevant to the 
situation where they are fully irrelevant and outside the focus of spatial attention, 
with an aim to elucidate whether expectation suppression is automatic or task-
dependent.
Materials and Methods
Participants
Approximately one week after participants performed the fMRI session described 
in Chapter 4, the same individuals completed the second fMRI session described 
here. Analyses are performed on the same 24 participants that were reported in 
the previous chapter (16 females, age 23.3 ± 3.2, mean ± standard deviation (SD)). 
All participants had normal or corrected-to-normal vision and gave written 
informed consent to participate in this study. Experimental procedures were 
approved by the local ethics committee (Commissie Mensgebonden Onderzoek 
region Arnhem-Nijmegen, the Netherlands).
Stimuli
A black central fixation point (luminance: 0.7 cd/m2) was displayed on a mean 
luminance gray background (luminance: 530 cd/m2) throughout the experiment. 
Stimuli were identical to those used in Chapter 4, with the exception of which 
stimuli were adjusted according to task performance (here, the fixation dot contrast 
‘dims’, as opposed to the rotation angle of off-diagonal gratings in Chapter 4). As 
per the first fMRI session, a subtle ‘flicker’ of the otherwise full contrast fixation dot 
was implemented through reducing the contrast of the dot (i.e., black to grey) for 
100 ms, 64 times in each block. In this session, however, the difference between full 
contrast (i.e., black) and ‘dimmed’ fixation dots was updated online using an 
adaptive staircase (1up-1down with step-size ratio 0.2845), intended to achieve 
approximately 78% accuracy (Garcia-Perez, 1998). The initial contrast value of 
the ‘dimmed’ fixation dots was determined by a preceding behavioural session 
(see Behavioural Session below). Across participants, the mean luminance value of 
the fixation dot ‘dims’ during the fMRI session was 159 (±64) cd/m2. Grating stimuli 
were annuli (outer diameter: 15° of visual angle; inner diameter: 1.5°) containing 
luminance-defined sinusoids that remained on screen for 500 ms. On each trial, 
gratings were presented at one of two average orientations (45° or 135°) and one 
of two contrast values (10% (Figure 5.1C) or 80% (Figure 5.1B)), with a random 
spatial phase selected from 10 values evenly spaced between 0 and 2π. Within 
each contrast level, 50% of trials were rotated by a small amount from the diagonals 
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(25% clockwise (CW) and 25% counter clockwise (CCW), and 50% of trials were 
presented along the diagonal (see Figure 5.1B-C). In order to match the sensory 
input between the first and second fMRI sessions as much as possible, for each 
participant, off-diagonal trials were rotated by the mean rotation angle across all 
off-diagonal trials presented during the first fMRI session (mean rotation: 7.2°, ± 
2.5°). Auditory stimuli consisted of two pure tones (450 and 1000 Hz) with 200 ms 
duration. Stimuli were generated using MATLAB (MathWorks, Natick, MA, US) in 
conjunction with Psychophysics Toolbox (Brainard, 1997). In the fMRI session, 
stimuli were displayed on a rear projection screen using a luminance-calibrated 
EIKI projector (60 Hz refresh rate, 1024 × 768 resolution) which participants viewed 
through a mirror. In the behavioural session, stimuli were displayed on a Samsung 
SynchMaster 940BF monitor (60 Hz refresh rate, 1024 × 768 resolution).
Figure 5.1. Experimental paradigm. 
A) Auditory cues predicted grating orientation (~45° or ~135°) with 75% validity. B-C) On 
every trial, a grating stimulus was presented 550 ms after the auditory cue. Grating stimuli 
were either perfectly aligned to a diagonal or rotated slightly clockwise or counterclockwise 
from the diagonal (red dashed line). These stimuli were irrelevant to participants’ task, which 
was to respond to subtle changes in the contrast of the fixation dot (black to grey). Red 
dashed lines were not presented to participants. B) A high contrast trial. Here the overall 
orientation of the grating is expected, and the grating is slightly off-diagonal. C) A low contrast 
trial. Here the grating is unexpected, and on the diagonal. High and low contrast trials were 
interleaved within blocks.
A B
C
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Experimental Design
Stimuli were presented in an event-related design, with 5.1-7.1 s between trials. 
Each trial consisted of an auditory tone, and 750 ms later, a grating stimulus 
(Figure 5.1B-C). Changes to the fixation contrast occurred independently of the 
tone and grating stimuli, with 0-3 fixation ‘dims’ per trial. The auditory tones 
predicted the orientation of the grating that would appear on that trial (CW/CCW) 
with 75% validity (Figure 5.1A) using the same tone-orientation contingencies used 
in the training and first fMRI session, however these stimuli were now completely 
irrelevant to the task that participants were performing. Participants were 
instructed to press a button on an MR-compatible button box as quickly as possible 
every time they saw the fixation dot briefly dim. Feedback was given between 
blocks (hit rate, mean RT, and the number of missed trials for that block). Participants 
completed eight blocks of 64 trials (two blocks per scanner run), for a total of 
512 trials. A screen displaying the predictive relationship between the tones and 
gratings was displayed for 2 s at the beginning of each scanner run, so before every 
second block.
Behavioural Session
Participants were introduced to both tasks during the behavioural session that was 
held outside the scanner approximately one week prior to the first fMRI session 
(approximately one to two weeks prior to the second fMRI session). After 
participants completed the section on the grating task (see Methods, Chapter 4), 
they were introduced to the fixation task. Once they understood and practiced the 
task, performance was titrated to 75% using a Quest staircase procedure (Watson 
and Pelli, 1983), which adjusted the contrast of the dimmed fixation dot. During this 
procedure, participants completed blocks of 64 trials until the fixation contrast was 
stable. We opted for a Quest staircase during the behavioural session because this 
allowed the evolution of the staircase to be relatively independent of the starting 
value; however we opted for a 1up-1down staircase in the fMRI session – starting 
at the final Quest value – because this ensured a lower level of trial-to-trial 
fluctuations in the online staircase. The behavioural session lasted between 45-90 
minutes in total.
fMRI Acquisition
Functional images were acquired on a 3T Trio MRI system (Siemens, Erlangen, 
Germany) using a 32-channel head coil, with a multi-band EPI sequence (TR 1.8 s, 
84 transversal slices, 2 x 2 x 2 mm in-plane resolution, TE 28 ms, field of view 
210 mm x 210 mm, flip angle 73°, multi-band acceleration factor of 3, GRAPPA 
acceleration factor of 2).
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fMRI Data Preprocessing
Data were pre-processed using SPM8 (http://www.fil.ion.ucl.ac.uk/spm; Wellcome 
Trust Centre for Neuroimaging, London, UK). Functional images were aligned 
together with the functional images of the experiment described in Chapter 4 to 
facilitate comparisons between the two fMRI sessions. For full details about 
preprocessing steps, please see Chapter 4, fMRI Data Preprocessing.
fMRI Data Analysis
Data were modelled using an event-related approach and analyzed within the 
framework of a General Linear Model (GLM), according to the procedures described 
in Chapter 4. Regressors for each task condition were constructed by convolving 
delta functions at stimulus onsets with SPM8’s canonical hemodynamic response 
function and its temporal and dispersion derivatives (Friston et al., 1998). Temporal 
and dispersion derivatives were included to capture possible deviations from the 
canonical HRF in terms of latency and duration of the BOLD response. In addition 
to task regressors (expectation x stimulus strength: expected-high contrast; unex-
pected-high contrast; expected-low contrast; unexpected-low contrast), the model 
included nuisance regressors for the screens displaying tone-grating contingencies, 
feedback, and breaks, as well as the motion parameters as described above (see 
fMRI Data Preprocessing). Regressors were specified per run, and all task runs (from 
both fMRI sessions) were included in one GLM. A 128 s high-pass filter removed 
low-frequency signal drifts.
 As a measure of BOLD amplitude, the resulting canonical HRF beta-weights for 
the conditions of interest were averaged across runs of each task separately. We 
restricted our analyses to 200 voxels within the V1 ROI that were most responsive 
to the grating stimulus during the localizer (for details about the localizer task and 
analysis, and construction of V1 ROIs, please see Experimental Design and fMRI Data 
Analysis, Chapter 4). To compare the response to the grating between the two 
tasks, we averaged the beta weights of these voxels separately for each condition, 
for each task. To test for an effect of task on the interaction between expectation 
and the contrast of the grating stimulus, we performed a three-way repeated 
measures ANOVA (rmANOVA) in SPSS with factors task (grating; fixation), 
expectation (expected; unexpected), and contrast (high; low). To further examine 
the interactions, we performed post-hoc t-tests on the expectation effects at each 
level of stimulus contrast. Expectation effects were calculated by subtracting the 
beta for expected gratings from the beta for unexpected gratings, such that 
positive values indicate a lower response to expected than unexpected gratings 
(expectation suppression). We statistically evaluated the robustness of the effect 
using 200 voxels. To verify whether our results were stable across different voxel 
selection criteria, we calculated the expectation effect (per contrast level) and the 
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corresponding standard error of the mean (SEM) over a range of included voxels 
(50 to 200 voxels, in steps of 25 voxels).
 It is possible that expectation may influence the latency and/or the duration of 
the neural response, and therefore the timing of the BOLD response. Therefore, to 
visualise the time course of the fitted BOLD response for each condition, we 
multiplied each HRF basis function (i.e., canonical, temporal, dispersion) by its fitted 
beta weight, and summed the three resulting timecourses.
Forward Modelling
To probe stimulus representations in the visual cortex, we used a forward modelling 
approach to reconstruct the orientation angle from the BOLD signal (Brouwer and 
Heeger, 2009, 2011). To perform the forward modelling analysis, task data were 
modelled with a separate GLM. The task regressors explained above were defined 
separately for each orientation, and additionally, because expected trials were 
three times as likely as unexpected trials, we split expected trials over three 
regressors so that the same number of trials would be used during the estimation 
of the expected and unexpected conditions. Again, information, feedback, and 
break screens, as well as the motion parameters, their first order derivatives and 
the square of these derivatives, were included in the model as nuisance regressors. 
Regressors were specified per run, with all task runs included in a single GLM. All 
GLMs for the multivariate analyses were performed in Matlab on the preprocessed 
data (high-pass filtered as per the amplitude analysis). To compensate for overall 
amplitude differences between runs, parameter estimates were normalized to 
z-scores for the localizer run and the experimental runs separately.
 For a detailed description of the forward modelling approach, please see 
Forward Modelling, Chapter 4. Briefly, we characterized the orientation selectivity of 
each voxel as a weighted sum of six hypothetical channels, evenly spaced within 
the 180° orientation space. In the first stage of the analysis, we used parameter 
estimates obtained from the localizer run to estimate a weight matrix which related 
the matrix of estimated response amplitudes for the eight orientations presented 
during the localizer to the matrix of hypothetical channel outputs. Weights 
therefore reflected the relative contribution of the six hypothetical channels in the 
forward model to the observed response amplitude of each voxel. Using these 
weights, the second stage of analysis reconstructed the channel outputs associated 
with the pattern of activity across voxels evoked by the stimuli in the main 
experiment, again using linear regression. We reconstructed the population 
response separately for each condition (expected-high contrast; unexpected-high 
contrast; expected-low contrast; unexpected-low contrast), within the 200 voxels 
that were most responsive to the grating stimulus during the localizer within the V1 
ROI (the same voxels as used in the amplitude analysis). We averaged the channel 
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responses to each condition over runs of the same task. Channel responses were 
zero-centred such that presented orientations (i.e., 135° and 45°) were set to 0°, 
and neighbouring channels were re-labelled relative to the presented channel 
(in other words, the 0° to 180° space became a -60° to +90° space – see Figure. 5.3).
 To quantify the amount of orientation information in the channel response, 
for each subject, we subtracted the response of the channel orthogonal to the 
presented orientation from the response of the channel at the presented 
orientation (i.e., for trials with 135° gratings, the response of the 45° channel was 
subtracted from the 135° channel, and vice versa for trials with 45° gratings) 
separately for each condition per task. To test whether our conditions influenced 
the amount of orientation signal present in the population response, we performed 
an rmANOVA with factors expectation (expected; unexpected) and contrast 
(high; low).
 To determine whether non-significant t-values reflect support for the null 
hypotheses, we used the online Bayes Factor Calculator (Rouder et al., 2009) to 
convert t-values to Scaled Jeffrey-Zellner-Siow ( JZS) Bayes factors. These factors are 
directly interpretable: they provide the odds ratio in favour of one hypothesis over 
the other. For each test we used a JZS Prior (Cauchy distribution on effect size), 
without scaling the prior on the effect size (r = 1; default value) (Rouder et al., 2009). 
Smaller values of r can be used when effect sizes are expected to be small, however 
the effect size of the expectation effect in Kok et al. (2012a) is large (0.83), obviating 
the need for scaling.
Results
Behaviour
During this session, the statistical regularities between the tones and gratings 
were irrelevant to the task, which was to respond to subtle decreases in the 
contrast of the fixation dot (black to grey). Participants performed the fixation task 
well: average hit rate was 75% (± 1.5%) and response time was 546 ms (± 36 ms), 
indicating that participants followed task instructions. The tight clustering of hit 
rates around 75% indicates that the online staircase functioned as intended.
Activity profile in primary visual cortex
To investigate whether spatial attention modulated the interaction between 
expectation and stimulus strength on neural activity in primary visual cortex, we 
compared the neural response to the grating stimulus when it was task-irrelevant 
(session 2) to when it was task-relevant (session 1). For this analysis, we selected 
voxels that displayed the largest response to the grating in an independent localizer 
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Figure 5.2. Stimulus activity in V1. 
A) Amplitude of BOLD response (in arbitrary units; “a.u.”) within the 200 most grating- 
responsive voxels for expected (green) and un-expected (red) stimuli for each contrast level 
for each task. There is a larger BOLD response to gratings when they are task-relevant, and 
independent of relevance, high contrast gratings (bright colours) drive a larger BOLD 
response than low contrast gratings (faded colours). Error bars reflect unbiased within- 
subjects corrected SEM (Cousineau, 2005; Morey, 2008). B) Expectation effects per number 
of included voxels, defined as the neural response to unexpected minus the response to 
expected gratings (fixation task, orange/yellow (high/low contrast); grating task, blue/cyan 
(high/low contrast)). Positive values indicate a lower response to expected than unexpected 
gratings (expectation suppression). Values close to zero indicate that expectation does not 
have an effect. Error bars reflect SEM. C) Timecourses of the fitted BOLD response for 
expected (green) and unexpected (red) stimuli for the fixation (solid lines) and grating (dashed 
lines) tasks, separately for high and low contrast. Significance reported on the basis of t-tests 
for effect ≠0. **p <.01; *p <05.
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scan. As in the previous chapter, we found that the effect of expectation was 
modulated by stimulus strength (F1,23=4.47, p = 0.045; Figure 5.2A); expectation 
suppressed the response to weak (low contrast), but not to strong (high contrast) 
stimuli. This effect was not significantly modulated by task-relevance (F1,23=1.71, 
p = 0.20). However, the effect did seem to be driven mainly by the task-relevant 
condition; when considering the fixation task in isolation, there was no evidence for 
a modulation of expectation by stimulus strength (F1,23=0.06, p = 0.8). To investigate 
whether the data supported the null hypothesis that there is no expectation 
suppression for task-irrelevant stimuli (i.e., during the fixation task), we converted 
the corresponding t-values for the expectation effect at each contrast level to JZS 
Bayes factors (Rouder et al., 2009). There was moderate support for the null 
hypothesis (i.e. no effect of expectation) for both contrast levels (5.3 and 5.4 times 
more likely than the alternative hypotheses, respectively). Therefore, while there 
was a clear effect of expectation when the grating stimuli were task-relevant, there 
was moderate support for the absence of such an effect when the grating stimuli 
were task-irrelevant. This suggests that the absence of a task effect on the 
interaction between stimulus strength and expectation does not, in this case, 
provide strong evidence that task-relevance is unimportant. Rather, the JZS Bayes 
factor corresponding to this effect suggests that the results are inconclusive (2.9; 
i.e., about 2.9 to 1 in favour of the null hypothesis). This indicates that these data 
lack the power to discern an effect of task-relevance on expectation suppression.
 wever, this is not for lack of an effect of task relevance overall. Task relevance 
strongly modulated the amplitude of the BOLD activity evoked by the grating 
stimuli (F1,23=12.44, p = 0.0018): there was a reduced neural response to the gratings 
when participants performed the fixation task. This suggests that our task 
manipulation was successful at diverting spatial attention away from the gratings. 
Similarly, stimulus strength strongly modulated the BOLD amplitude (F1,23=106.68, 
p = 4.14e-10). The strength of this modulation did not differ between tasks 
(F1,23=0.77, p = 0.39).
 To evaluate whether the effect of expectation was consistent over different 
voxel selection criteria and to compare it to the effects during the grating task, we 
calculated an expectation suppression index by subtracting the beta for expected 
gratings from the beta for unexpected gratings over a range of included voxels. The 
absence of expectation suppression was independent of how many voxels were 
included in the analysis: the expectation effect for both low and high contrast 
gratings consistently overlapped with zero during the fixation task (orange/yellow 
(high/low contrast) lines in Figure.5. 2B). 
 For illustration purposes, we visualised the timecourse of the fitted BOLD 
response to the different conditions and tasks (Figure 5.2C). Both task and stimulus 
strength modulated the peak of the BOLD response: peak amplitudes were higher 
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during the grating task, and across both tasks, peak amplitudes were higher for 
high contrast gratings. However, the timecourses were highly similar for expected 
and unexpected stimuli: expectation did not change the onset or peak latency of 
the BOLD response.
Sensory representations in primary visual cortex
Next, in the same set of voxels, we investigated how the pattern of neural activity 
representing the stimulus was influenced by task, stimulus strength and 
expectation. We quantified the amount of orientation information by subtracting 
the response of the orientation channel tuned to the orthogonal diagonal 
orientation (45°/135°) from the channel tuned to the presented diagonal orientation 
(45°/135°). Consistent with the BOLD amplitude results, the amount of orientation 
information in the population response was modulated by both task-relevance 
(F1,23=10.51, p = 0.0036) and stimulus strength (F1,23=44.14, p = 8.89e-7; Figure 5.3). 
Expectation did not significantly modulate the orientation signal (F1,23=1.54, p = 0.23), 
nor did it interact with either or both of the other factors (all p > 0.10). However, task 
did modulate the effect of stimulus strength (F1,23=14.63, p = 0.00087), such that 
Figure 5.3. Orientation information in V1.
The channel response (in arbitrary units; “a.u.”) reconstructed from the 200 most grating- 
responsive voxels for expected (green) and un-expected (red) stimuli for the fixation (solid 
lines) and grating (dashed lines) tasks, separately for high and low contrast. Channels are 
ordered such that 0° maps onto the nearest diagonal of the stimulus orientation presented 
on that trial (i.e., 45° becomes 0° for ~45° trials), with 90° representing the orthogonal 
orientation. Error bars reflect unbiased within-subjects corrected SEM (Cousineau, 2005; 
Morey, 2008).
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there was a task-relevance boosted the increase of the orientation signal for high 
contrast than for low contrast gratings (i.e., multiplicative gain of the contrast effect 
when gratings were spatially attended). 
Discussion
In this experiment, we investigated whether modulations of sensory processing 
by expectation constitute an automatic computation within the visual system. 
We compared the response modulation by expectation when stimuli were task- 
relevant and attended to the situation where they were task-irrelevant and outside 
the focus of spatial attention.
 While there was a clear suppressive effect of expectation for task-relevant 
stimuli presented at low contrast (Chapter 4), this effect was absent for the same 
stimuli when they were irrelevant to the task. Furthermore, the Bayes factors for 
the effect of expectation during the fixation task suggest moderate support for an 
absence of an expectation effect when attention is diverted. While it then appears 
that the expectation effect is abolished when attention is diverted from the grating 
stimuli, the absence of a significant difference in the expectation effect between 
tasks precludes this strong conclusion. In fact, the Bayes factor for this statistical 
test suggests that our data is does not strongly favour either the alternative or null 
hypothesis, possibly due to a lack of power. Stimulus contrast and task-relevance 
both strongly modulated the BOLD activity in the primary visual cortex, suggesting 
that our experimental manipulations of these factors were successful.
 In the present study, there was no effect of expectation on the neural response 
in V1 to the grating stimuli when participants were performing a task at fixation. 
Put differently, when grating stimuli were task-irrelevant, the ability to predict a 
specific grating did not appear to culminate in a differential neural response to the 
stimulus. The lack of expectation suppression during the fixation task appears to 
be at odds with previous studies that do report expectation suppression for 
task-irrelevant stimuli (Den Ouden et al., 2009; Alink et al., 2010; St. John-Saaltink et 
al., 2015). The discrepancy between the current findings and those of one of our 
own previous studies (St. John-Saaltink et al., 2015) seems particularly striking, 
given that many aspects of the experimental design were similar. Specifically, in 
both studies the orientation of grating stimuli was predicted by preceding auditory 
cues, stimuli were presented at the same spatial location, and attention was 
diverted from the gratings by a perceptual task at fixation. While at first glance 
these results appear to be contradictory, there are two important differences 
between the current study and our previous one that may provide an explanation 
for the distinct results, which we outline below.
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 First, the previous study compared a fully predictable condition (100% cue validity) 
with a non-predictable condition (50% cue validity; no orientation information). In 
the current design, all cues were 75% valid, and we compared validly and invalidly 
expected stimuli. In other words, in the previous study we compared situations 
with and without predictions, whereas here there was always an expectation that 
was then violated in 25% of trials. A recent study has shown that this may be an 
important distinction (Hsu et al., 2015): in the context of auditory tone sequences, 
these authors report reduced activity when predictions were confirmed compared 
to violated, yet the least activity for tones about which there was no specific 
expectation in the first place. While this issue is not yet fully understood, these 
findings do suggest that the brain responds differently to sensory input that 
violates an expectation compared to input for which no specific expectation could 
be formed.
 Second, while our previous study reported expectation suppression while 
subjects performed a perceptual task at fixation, the task used here (detection of 
subtle changes in the contrast of the fixation point) was less perceptually demanding 
than the task used in the previous study (identification of letters distorted by high 
levels of visual noise). Therefore, the amount of perceptual competition between 
the task-relevant stimuli at fixation and the irrelevant grating stimuli was likely 
much higher in the previous study. While this may seem like an inconsequential 
difference, the level of load posed by a task can have important consequences on 
the processing of task-irrelevant stimuli (Lavie et al., 2004; Lavie, 2005). It is possible 
that perceptual competition may be one of the factors which drives expectation 
suppression, such that predictable stimuli are suppressed only when they compete 
for task-relevant perceptual resources (St. John-Saaltink et al., 2015). Indeed, the 
previous study found no expectation suppression when attention was diverted 
from the gratings by a (perceptually simple) task at fixation that instead loaded 
working memory resources (St. John-Saaltink et al., 2015). 
 In addition to increasing the overall BOLD amplitude, we found that task- 
relevance also increased the orientation-specific BOLD signal. Furthermore, this 
increase was modulated by stimulus strength; there was a larger effect of attention 
on the orientation signal for high contrast than for low contrast stimuli, in line with 
a multiplicative gain effect of attention (Reynolds and Heeger, 2009). Notably, this 
modulation of attention by stimulus strength was opposite in direction to the 
modulation of expectation suppression by stimulus strength, which was rather 
strongest for low contrast stimuli.We found no evidence of an effect of expectation 
on the orientation signal. 
 A potential limitation to the current study is that all participants performed the 
grating task during the first session and the fixation task during the second fMRI 
session, making it difficult to rule out possible contributions of increased training 
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or stimulus familiarity on our results. However, we do not believe this would be a 
likely explanation for the effects reported here, as increased exposure to the 
statistical relationships between the tones and grating orientations should have 
only reinforced the predictive nature of the stimuli. Furthermore, participants were 
extensively trained on the stimuli in the behavioural session, so they had a high 
level of familiarity with the experimental stimuli and tasks before either fMRI 
session.
 In conclusion, the issue of whether expectation suppression is automatic or 
task-dependent is complex, and has not yet been resolved fully (Schröger et al., 
2015). Some studies have concluded that expectation effects require attention 
(Larsson and Smith, 2012), while other results provide evidence for attention 
independent effects (Den Ouden et al., 2009; Alink et al., 2010; St. John-Saaltink et 
al., 2015). It is likely that this partly depends on the exact task used to divert 
attention, such as what type of resources (e.g. perceptual or working memory) are 
loaded (St. John-Saaltink et al., 2015), and whether the task induces perceptual 
competition between the predictable (irrelevant) stimuli and the task-relevant 
stimuli. Future studies may be able to shed more light on this issue, by orthogonally 
manipulating these factors within the same experimental design. 
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Vision is profoundly important to how we perceive and interact with the external 
world. The information we collect about the world through vision is rich and 
complex: a typical scene contains numerous objects which may be at different 
distances, under different lighting conditions, and often partially occluded by other 
elements of the scene. In order to process such dense and complex visual 
information efficiently, the brain makes predictions about the likely causes of 
sensory input. These predictions depend on prior experiences with the world, 
through which we learn, for instance, that distance causes objects to appear 
smaller than they are. Under certain circumstances, priors can lead to visual 
illusions – for instance, by inflating perceived object size. This is why the moon 
appears to be larger than usual when it is close to the horizon, and why the 
rightmost soldier in Figure 1.1C appears to be larger than the other figures.
 In this thesis, I have examined how prior experience influences the way in 
which the brain responds to the sensory environment, and consequently shapes 
how we perceive the world. Specifically, I have investigated how visual information 
is processed by the brain depending upon the circumstance in which it arrives: 
what input has preceded it, whether specific features of the visual input could be 
predicted prior to the arrival of the stimulus, and which cognitive resources were 
available.
 Chapter 2 investigated a natural prior about object stability across time. From 
moment to moment, the majority of visual stimulation does not change or changes 
only subtly. For example, when you are looking at the houses that line the other 
side of your street and a large truck momentarily occludes them from view, the row 
of houses will reappear unchanged once the truck has passed. Even when you are 
in a more volatile environment, such as walking in a forest during a storm, wind and 
rain can cause local variations in the appearance of objects, but they do not change 
the relevant aspects of the environment needed to navigate to shelter, such as 
position and size. Indeed, faster variations in input often occur as the result of 
noise, and performance (here, navigation) can be improved when these variations 
are disregarded. One way to accomplish this is to ‘smooth’ visual input over time, 
such that perception depends partly on recent visual history. Humans appear to 
use a prior which acts as precisely such a temporal filter: perception is biased 
towards recently-seen items, such that objects appear to be more similar to the 
preceding object than they truly are. In the experiment described in Chapter 2, I 
provided the first evidence that this bias, or serial dependence, is reflected in 
stimulus representations in the primary visual cortex. This suggests that our prior 
knowledge of object stability affects the processing of visual input already at the 
earliest cortical stages, rather than being something we take into account after 
visual processing is completed.
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 In Chapter 3, I compared how the ability to generate precise sensory 
predictions about visual stimuli influenced how visual areas of the brain responded 
to those stimuli, and how this effect was altered by the type of task that participants 
were engaged in. Here, I contrasted blocks in which the orientation of stimuli 
displayed in the visual surround could be precisely predicted to blocks in which 
a precise prediction about orientation could not be formed, while participants 
performed three tasks that loaded distinct cognitive resources. When the cued 
stimuli in the surround were task-irrelevant and perceptual resources were 
engaged by a challenging task centrally, predictable stimuli were suppressed 
relative to nonpredictable stimuli. However, when instead working memory 
resources were loaded, the task-irrelevant stimulus in the surround was not 
modulated by predictability. The fact that a distracting working memory task (but 
not a perceptual task) prevented prediction effects may suggest that visual 
prediction shares some cognitive resources with working memory – for instance, 
the ability to reinstate stimuli from memory into sensory cortex. Surprisingly, when 
participants performed a task in which the cued stimuli were actually relevant, 
there was no effect of expectation on the neural response. I return to this finding 
below.
 In Chapters 4-5, I manipulated participants’ expectations about sensory input 
while simultaneously manipulating the strength of the sensory input. Current 
theories of perceptual processing would predict that expectations influence 
perception more strongly when sensory inputs are weak. In Chapter 4, participants 
performed a task on the stimuli that were being cued. The effect of expectation on 
the sensory response in primary visual cortex interacted with the strength of 
sensory input: expectation suppression was found for the low contrast stimuli, 
while expectation did not influence the response to high contrast stimuli. As stated 
above, this is in line with current theories of perceptual inference: you should rely 
on prior knowledge more when sensory inputs are weak than when they are 
strong. In Chapter 5 we found that when participants performed a distracting task 
at fixation, while being exposed to identical predictions and stimuli as in Chapter 4, 
this interaction was not present. In fact, here there was no evidence of an effect of 
expectation on the neural response for either contrast level.
 In sum, the studies in this thesis provide evidence that the brain’s response to 
the environment is modulated by prior experience, but that this effect is highly 
dependent on internal and external processing conditions.
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Expectation evokes stimulus templates
A central question that can be asked about the effects described in this thesis is 
whether they rely upon the same neural mechanism. To answer this, I first discuss 
how, mechanistically, expectations might influence the way in which the brain 
responds to sensory input. When, for example, a tone predicts a specific stimulus 
– say a grating oriented at 45 degrees – what happens in the brain after the 
predictive tone sounds? A proposal gaining increasing popularity is that a ‘template’ 
of the expected stimulus becomes activated in sensory cortex (Wyart et al., 2012; 
SanMiguel et al., 2013; Kok et al., 2014). This may be achieved via subthreshold 
activations of the neurons that code for the stimulus (Wyart et al., 2012). This 
template can then be compared to the sensory input when it arrives, facilitating 
stimulus processing when the input and template match. Conversely, a mismatch 
between the template and sensory input often results in increased activity (Den 
Ouden et al., 2009; Todorovic et al., 2011; Kok et al., 2012a), possibility because both 
the population that codes for the template as well as the population coding for the 
unexpected input become active.
 Support for the notion that expectations activate stimulus templates is 
provided by studies that induce the expectation of a particular stimulus, but then 
do not present any stimuli for the remainder of the trial. When expected stimuli are 
omitted, sensory cortex still responds at the time the stimulus was expected to 
occur, and this response resembles the expected stimulus (Todorovic et al., 2011; 
Kok et al., 2012a; SanMiguel et al., 2013). Importantly, since there is no bottom-up 
input to drive the activity, this cortical response must be internally generated. A 
template can therefore be understood as a neural representation of a stimulus 
that is representationally similar to the neural response elicited when the stimulus 
is presented (however, significantly less strong). This result has been demonstrated 
in both visual and auditory cortices.
 The idea that expectation activates weak or subthreshold stimulus templates 
provides a compelling account of the interaction between expectation and the 
strength of the sensory input: the influence of a weak template compared to the 
(strong) sensory input would be relatively much larger when the sensory signal is 
weak, leading to a larger expectation effect. In other words, the same subthreshold 
template will have a larger net effect when it is integrated with weak sensory input 
than with strong sensory input (Wyart et al., 2012). This is precisely what I found in 
Chapter 4: expectation suppression was larger for low contrast than high contrast 
gratings.
 Once active, expectation templates have been shown to bias the perception 
of ambiguous, weak or noisy sensory input (Sterzer et al., 2008; Chalk et al., 2010). 
Perhaps you have previously encountered an ambiguous stimulus such as the 
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Necker Cube (Figure 6.1) – a three-dimensional line drawing famous due the 
perceptual ambiguity it induces as to which face is ‘closest’ to the viewer. If you 
stare at Figure 6.1 long enough, your percept will switch to the other ‘solution’, of 
the input (i.e., you will see the other face as ‘closest’). To demonstrate the power of 
priors on the perception of ambiguous stimuli, one experiment led participants to 
believe that a certain colour of eyeglasses lens would lead to a particular solution 
(i.e., percept) of an ambiguous stimulus (Sterzer et al., 2008). However during this 
training, participants were actually presented with non-ambiguous stimuli displaying 
one of the two perceptual solutions. Tested afterwards on truly ambiguous stimuli, 
participants reported their percepts in accordance to the colour of eyeglasses lens 
they were wearing, despite the fact that the glasses had no influence on the 
ambiguity of the visual input. In this case, the colour of eyeglasses lens could be 
understood as activating a template of a particular perceptual solution, which then 
biased perception of the incoming, ambiguous stimulation. Similar results have 
been found when stimulation is unambiguous but noisy or weak (Chalk et al., 2010). 
For example, through manipulating the motion coherence of clouds of moving 
dots, the overall direction of motion can be very difficult to perceive. An experiment 
that induced expectations about motion directions using auditory cues (in a 
manner similar to Chapters 3-5) found that both perceptual reports and neural 
representations in visual cortex were biased towards the expected motion 
direction (Kok et al., 2013). While subtle – the attractive bias was on the order of a 
few degrees – the effect was highly reliable and furthermore correlated to the 
strength of the representational bias in primary visual cortex.
Figure 6.1. The Necker Cube.
This two-dimensional image is perceived as a three-dimensional cube; however this image is 
ambiguous as to which face of the cube is closest to the viewer and therefore perception 
oscillates between the two possibilities. The middle and right cube depict the two ways in 
which the cube can be perceived (with the shaded face ‘closest’).
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 Can stimulus templates also account for the effects of more implicit or 
automatic priors such as the serial dependence reported in Chapter 2? This is 
indeed a possibility. However, in this case the templates may originate from a 
different source, either from within visual cortex or from the fronto-parietal regions 
implicated in perceptual decision-making (Gold and Shadlen, 2007). Given that 
serial dependence was driven by the previous perceptual decision more than by the 
previous input, the latter option appears more likely. This is in line with previous 
research that demonstrated that primary visual cortex first shows activity 
corresponding to the sensory input and later to the perceptual decision made on 
the basis of that input (Nienborg and Cumming, 2009). 
Effects of expectation depend on task
Why do we not always see a modulation of the neural response by expectation? 
Many studies (including those in this thesis) have found that participants’ task set 
influences the effect of expectation on neural processing (Larsson and Smith, 
2012; Schröger et al., 2015). For instance, in Chapter 3, I found that expectation 
had a suppressive effect when participants performed a task that loaded perceptual 
resources, but showed no such effect when the task instead loaded working 
memory resources. What makes this particularly striking is that during both tasks, 
the sensory stimulation was identical, and the cued stimuli were entirely irrelevant 
to participants’ tasks. Indeed, the only aspect that differed was whether participants 
were performing a 1-back task on hard to identify letters, or a 2-back task on the 
(easy to perceive) colour of those same letters. One explanation of this result is that 
working memory and perceptual predictions share some neural resources, and 
that therefore perceptual predictions can be disrupted by high working memory 
loads. For instance, the template activation that occurs during stimulus expectation 
has an equivalent concept within the memory literature: cortical reinstatement 
(Danker and Anderson, 2010). When a stimulus is recalled during a working memory 
task, the same neurons that were active during stimulus processing become 
reactivated during the recall period. In other words, both stimulus expectation and 
stimulus recall appear to recruit the population of neurons that process the 
sensory input, when this input is either expected (Kok et al., 2014) or recalled 
(Harrison and Tong, 2009; Albers et al., 2013; Bosch et al., 2014). Hence, it is possible 
that when a distracting task occupies a lot of the resources needed to form 
expectation templates, no modulation of neural responses by expectation occurs.
 A special case of this may occur when the task itself requires instantiating 
stimulus templates. For instance, one study found that the neural response to 
sensory input was suppressed by expectation only when that specific sensory 
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input was not already being prepared for as a result of the task instructions 
(Todorovic, 2015, Chapter 5). Specifically, when the task involved preparing for a 
particular tone (tone A), the neural response to this tone was no longer modulated 
by expectation. However, when a different tone was prepared or the visual modality 
was attended, the predictive cue that tone A would occur did suppress the neural 
response to tone A (i.e., typical expectation suppression). One explanation of this 
result is that preparing for a particular stimulus involves forming and maintaining a 
template of that stimulus, which may interfere the formation of expectation 
templates, therefore abolishing any neural effects of expectation. This explanation 
also offers a possible account of the absence of expectation suppression when the 
cued stimuli in Chapter 3 were task relevant. The task involved detecting low 
special frequency gratings, thus the instantiation of a target (low spatial frequency 
grating) template in order to solve this task may have similarly prevented the 
formation of expectation templates.
 Interference of the ability to generate expectation templates may occur either 
because the sensory neurons that code for the stimulus are already ‘occupied’ by 
the stimulus template induced by the current task, or because the higher-level 
resources required for generating stimulus templates (e.g. in frontoparietal cortex 
(Curtis and D’Esposito, 2003; D’Esposito and Postle, 2015) or hippocampus (Bosch 
et al., 2014; Gordon et al., 2014)) are otherwise engaged. The results of Chapter 3 
could be interpreted as evidence of a dependence on working memory resources, 
given that the expectation effect in Chapter 3 was abolished during the working 
memory task. However, a resource competition account provides an alternative 
interpretation of these results: the perceptual task may have induced perceptual 
competition between the task-relevant degraded letters and the cued grating 
stimuli in the surround, creating an incentive to suppress the distracting gratings 
as much as possible (and predictive cues allowed this to be done more effectively). 
Thus, according to this explanation, the relative lack of perceptual competition 
during the working memory task (and not the working memory load itself) was 
responsible for the lack of expectation suppression during the working memory 
load. The question of which resources are required for the generation of expectation 
templates could be resolved by an experiment that uses a different modality for 
the distracting tasks – for example, a target detection task and a 2-back task on 
auditory tones – while expectations about visual grating stimuli are induced by 
coloured cues at fixation. If working memory resources are necessary for generating 
expectation templates, there should be no difference in the response to expected 
and unexpected gratings in visual cortex when participants are performing the 
auditory 2-back task, but there should be expectation suppression during the 
auditory target detection task. However, if the alternative, perceptual competition 
account is correct, then expectation suppression should occur during neither of the 
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distracting auditory tasks, since the cued and task-relevant stimuli no longer 
compete for perceptual resources in visual cortex, given that they are presented in 
different sensory modalities. Insight into which resources are involved in the ability 
to generate predictions about upcoming sensory input will greatly enhance our 
understanding of the nature of expectation, and how it relates to other concepts 
like cortical reinstatement during memory tasks.
 I have suggested that a form of expectation templates may also drive the serial 
dependence effect found in Chapter 2. This proposal could be tested using a 
paradigm that has participants perform two distracting tasks, one loading 
perceptual resources and one loading working memory resources, while leveraging 
neuroimaging techniques to evaluate the serial dependence between the repre-
sentations of subsequent ignored grating stimuli in visual cortex. Firstly, this could 
determine whether serial dependence occurs for stimuli on which no explicit 
perceptual report is made. Is the neural representation of an ignored stimulus 
biased by previous stimulation, or does this bias require a perceptual decision on 
the current stimulation? This question is hard to answer using psychophysics 
alone, since in such studies a behavioural report is necessarily required in order to 
have a measure of stimulus processing. Therefore, neuroimaging techniques would 
provide a unique opportunity to investigate this issue. Additionally, there is the 
question of whether serial dependence, like other types of perceptual expectations, 
requires cognitive resources to generate stimulus templates, or whether it is more 
automatic. This question can be answered by comparing serial dependence effects 
between the two distracting tasks; if serial dependence is a fully automatic process, 
it should occur during both tasks, while it should be abolished during the distracting 
working memory task in case it requires the generation of stimulus templates (see 
Chapter 3). 
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Concluding statement
In closing, considered together these findings point to a complex interaction 
between expectation and task set which is currently insufficiently understood. 
However, it is clear that task set plays a less straightforward role than previously 
thought: it is not simply a matter of whether stimuli that are task relevant or 
irrelevant, but rather the exact requirements of the task that determines whether 
prior expectation modulates the sensory response. Future research should try 
to more precisely determine the interplay between expectation and other cognitive 
processes, such as attention, working memory, and imagery. One particularly 
intriguing outstanding question is whether expectation, working memory, and 
imagery all use the same cortical reinstatement process (Pearson and Westbrook, 
2015). Resolving these issues will hopefully shed more light on the neural mechanisms 
underlying our perception of the world.
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Heb je ooit een slok genomen van iets waarvan je dacht dat het water was, maar 
wat koffie bleek te zijn? Als je ooit een dergelijke ervaring hebt gehad, dan weet je 
dat het iets wat je normaal gesproken lekker vindt heel onprettig kan maken. Dit 
simpele voorbeeld illustreert dat verwachtingen je sensorische systeem kunnen 
voorbereiden op een bepaalde invoer, en dat hoe je iets waarneemt ervan afhangt 
of het verwacht of verrassend was.
 Een ander voorbeeld van hoe verwachtingen je waarneming kunnen beïnvloeden 
zijn visuele illusies. Kijk maar eens naar de afbeelding hieronder. De maan aan de 
hemel is groter dan de maan tussen de treinrails, toch? In werkelijkheid zijn ze even 
groot, maar het perspectief aanwezig in de afbeelding leidt ertoe dat ons visueel 
systeem een andere conclusie trekt. Dit komt doordat we door onze uitgebreide 
ervaring met de wereld hebben geleerd dat waarnemen op afstand ervoor zorgt 
dat dingen er kleiner uitzien dan wanneer we ze van dichtbij bekijken. Doordat het 
perspectief van de afbeelding ervoor zorgt dat de maan in de hemel veel verder 
weg lijkt dan de maan tussen de rails, nemen we hem als groter waar.
Figuur 1. Geloof je ogen niet.
Perspectief kan ervoor zorgen dat identieke voorwerpen verschillende afmetingen lijken te 
hebben. Onze kennis dat afstand een voorwerp kleiner doet lijken zorgt ervoor dat de maan 
aan de hemel veel groter lijkt dan de maan tussen de treinrails.
Image credit: NASA
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 Visuele informatie kan heel complex zijn, met meerdere voorwerpen op ver- 
schillende afstanden, elk met andere belichting, waarbij het ene voorwerp ook nog 
eens deels het zicht op het ander kan ontnemen. Het gebruik van onze kennis van 
de wereld om deze wirwar te kunnen ontrafelen zorgt ervoor dat onze waarneming 
soms onderhevig is aan illusies, zoals hierboven beschreven, maar dit kleine nadeel 
weegt niet op tegen het grote voordeel dat we hierdoor complexe en vaak ambigue 
visuele informatie efficiënt (en gewoonlijk correct!) kunnen verwerken.
 Een ander soort verwachting dat we over onze omgeving hebben is dat de 
meeste dingen van het een op het andere moment grotendeels hetzelfde blijven: 
een fiets verandert niet opeens in een auto. Stel je voor dat je de skyline van New 
York bewondert vanaf de oever van de Hudson rivier en dat je even wegkijkt om je 
camera erbij te pakken: wanneer je weer opkijkt zal de skyline er nog net zo uitzien 
als vlak daarvoor. Dit soort verwachting kan er zelfs voor zorgen dat dingen meer 
lijken op wat je net gezien hebt dan dat ze eigenlijk waren! Dit lijkt misschien raar, 
maar dit heeft een duidelijk voordeel: heel snelle veranderingen in de wereld zijn 
meestal het gevolg van ruis (stel je voor dat je naar de skyline kijkt tijdens een 
regenstorm), en daardoor kun je voorwerpen beter herkennen wanneer je deze 
snelle veranderingen weg filtert. In Hoofdstuk 2 heb ik dit effect onderzocht, en vond ik 
dat mensen hetzelfde voorwerp anders waarnemen afhankelijk van wat ze net 
daarvoor hadden gezien. En dat niet alleen, dit effect was ook zichtbaar in de manier 
waarop het voorwerp door de hersenen werd verwerkt, zelfs al in de vroegste stadia! 
Dit suggereert dat de verwachtingen die we hebben over onze omgeving op basis 
van onze kennis van de wereld kan beïnvloeden hoe sensorische informatie “eruit 
ziet” volgens ons brein, misschien zelfs al vanaf het moment dat het binnenkomt. 
 Ondanks dat de meeste van dit soort invloeden op onze waarneming onbewust 
plaatsvinden, en daardoor automatisch lijken, zou het kunnen dat ze afhangen van 
hoe afgeleid we zijn door andere dingen die op hetzelfde moment gebeuren. Een 
manier om dit te onderzoeken is door te kijken hoe je brein reageert op voorspelbare 
informatie wanneer je afgeleid wordt door taken die verschillende cognitieve 
systemen bezighouden. Stel je bijvoorbeeld voor dat je twee dingen tegelijkertijd 
doet, zoals het volgen van een gesprek terwijl je i) een telefoonnummer onthoudt 
tot het je lukt om het te draaien, of ii) door een zware regenstorm rijdt. Taak i) 
houdt je werkgeheugen bezig, terwijl taak ii) je perceptuele systemen bezighoudt. 
In Hoofdstuk 3 liet ik proefpersonen dit soort taken doen, en heb ik onderzocht of 
dat beïnvloedde hoe de hersenen reageerden op (irrelevante) voorspelbare 
informatie in de omgeving. De resultaten van dit onderzoek lieten zien dat het 
brein gebruik maakt van voorspelbare informatie, ook wanneer je afgeleid wordt 
door een andere taak, maar alleen als deze taak je werkgeheugen niet belast. 
Dit suggereert dat het vormen en toepassen van verwachtingen waarschijnlijk een 
bepaalde mate van werkgeheugen vereist.
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 In conclusie, in dit proefschrift heb ik onderzocht hoe onze verwachtingen 
beïnvloeden hoe ons brein reageert op sensorische informatie, en hoe dit vervolgens 
onze waarneming vormt. Om precies te zijn heb ik onderzocht hoe visuele invoer 
verwerkt wordt door ons brein, afhankelijk van de omstandigheden waarin ze 
binnenkomt: wat ervóór kwam, wat je verwacht te zien, en welke cognitieve 
systemen je tot je beschikking hebt.
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